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In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. government officials 
and China analysts began to discuss the possibility of an 
emerging "China threat." This thesis assesses China's 
military modernization program in order to determine its 
capability and primary intent. Four aspects of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) are examined: the history of military 
modernization, PLA economic activities, the PLA' s 
modernization strategy and force utilization. 
Final analysis indicates that China's military 
modernization program is intended primarily to enhance 
domestic stability and economic grov:th and not to seek 
regional hegemony by force. However, there are several 
points of contention that may spur China to military action. 
Two possible areas of future conflict are Tai1.van and the 
South China Sea. I maintain that China will probably refrain 
from aggression in these areas unless it feels its interests 
are endangered. It does not have the will 6r the capability 
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In the wake of the Cold War, China analysts began to 
discuss an emerging "China threat." The "China threat 
theory" assumes that China's economic growth will lead to 
increased military capabilities which in turn will constitute 
a threat to Asia and possibly even the United States. 
Critiques of the "China threat theory" maintain that China 
does not have the capability or intent to pursue regional 
hegemony by force or threat of force. 
Faced with these two views on China's potential threat 
to Asia, this thesis examines the modernization of China's 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) in order to clarify China's 
current military capability and shed light on its intentions. 
This thesis is divided into five chapters with each 
examining a different component of PLA modernization. In 
each chapter, I attempt to determine whether the primary goal 
of PLA modernization is to create a force capable of 
achieving hegemony in Asia through force or whether 
modernization is intended primarily to promote domestic 
stability and economic growth. The introductory chapter 
explores several possible reasons for PLA modernization and 
attemptS to determine the priority that China places on its 
military modernization in relation to other modernizations. 
Chapter II analyzes the PLA's economic activities in order to 
determine whether they enhance or detract from the PLA's 
xi 
ability to conduct war. In Chapter III, I examine the steps 
that China is taking to modernize its forces. A review of 
specific weapon systems purchased by the military over the 
last several years is especially useful in determining 
whether China is primarily concerned with defense or seeks to 
obtain regional hegemony through force or threat of force. 
Chapter IV explores force utilization over the last few years 
including both force deployments and exercise activity. 
Finally, Chapter'V discusses implication's of China's 
military modernization. 
The Chinese have repeatedly emphasized its military 
modernization program over the last two decades in response 
to changes in the security environment. It appears to be 
aimed predominately at defending China from both internal and 
external threats. The rise in defense spending between 1991 
and 1996 seems to be in response to perceived threats to 
China's internal stability which includes Taiwan and the 
South China Sea. 
While China has placed an increased emphasis on military 
modernization in the last few years, most analysts agree that 
its military capability remains 15-20 years behind the United 
States. Even if China intended to use force in the region it 
does not have the capability to conduct sustained operations 
beyond the mainland. 
This examination of China's military modernization 
highlights the PLA's capabilities and may give some insight 
xii 
into its intentions. Analysis of PLA deployment patterns 
over the last two decades and recent military exercise 
activity enables a more indepth understanding of China's 
intentions. 
In order for China to pose a threat to the Asia Pacific 
region, it must have both the military capability to carry 
out such a threat and the intent to use that capability. 
Analysis of the modernization of the PLA indicates that while 
China's milita~y -might is growing, for the most part, it is 
incapable of power projection and force sustainment. In 
addition, China does not seem to have any intention of 
obtaining regional hegemony by force. Chinese leaders are 
more interested in economic growth than in an attempt to 
obtain regional hegemony by force or threat of force. Any 
move in the latter direction would destabilize the region and 
impede China's economic growth. This does not mean, however, 
that there are no potential flash points in the region. I 
maintain that China is currently satisfied with the status 
quo but may react aggressively if it perceives that its 
interests are threatened in Taiwan or the South China Sea. 
xiii 
xiv 
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In the wake of the Cold War, U.S. government officials 
and China analysts began to discuss the possibility of an 
emerging "China threat." The "China threat theory" assumes 
that China's tremendous economic growth will lead to 
increased military capabilities which in turn will constitute 
a threat to Asia and possibly even the United States. 
Opponents of the "China threat theory" maintain that China 
does not have the capability or intent to pursue regional 
hegemony by force or threat of force. In this chapter, I 
will examine both sides of the "China threat" argument. I 
will also give an overview of this thesis, outlining my 
research question, hypothesis, methodology and relevance of 
the research. 
Proponents of the "China threat theory" claim that China 
has expansionist tendencies and hegemonic intentions. Some 
advocates even go so far as to compare present day China to 
Germany and Japan in the early part of this century. Ezra 
Vogel, a Harvard Professor and the U.S. intelligence 
community's national intelligence officer for East Asia, 
observes, "China is now just starting out as a growing power, 
just as Japan and Germany were growing powers at the 
beginning of this century." (Mann 1995) Gideon Rachman, Asia 
editor of The Economist, also makes such comparisons. Citing 
China's explanation for recent military exercises in the 
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vicinity of Taiwan and Chinese aggression in the South China 
Sea, Rachman notes: 
expansionist powers can usually marshal some sort of 
historical argument to backup their claims: Hitler, 
after all, had historical claims to Austria and the 
Sudetentland that some people regarded as respectable at 
the time. (Rachman 1996) 
Most "China threat" advocates point to the Taiwan situation 
and China's claim to the South China Sea as indicators of 
China's ambition to obtain hegemony in Asia. 
As noted above, the "China threat" is based primarily on 
two considerations, China's rapidly developing economy and 
its growing military might. China's economy grew at rates of 
more than nine percent a year throughout the 1980s and 
continues to grow at that rate or better. (Mann 1995) As a 
result, it currently boasts the third largest economy in the 
world. At the same time, China has been pursuing a program 
of military modernization. While defense spending in the 
West has been flat or declining, China's defense budget is 
estimated to have increased by over 40 percent in the last 
six years. The increase in funding has allowed China to 
purchase advanced military equipment from Russia and advanced 
technology from Israel and Iran. However, a growing economy 
and a modern military alone do not create a threat; there 
must be intent as well. Chong-Pin Lin of the American 
Enterprise Institute believes that "Chinese military 
modernization has gained momentum and will likely bring 
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forward a more assertive China in international 
interactions." (Mann 1995) 
While most government officials claim that they do not 
consider China a threat, there seems to be a growing 
pessimism and wariness in regards to China. A U.S. diplomat 
in Singapore maintained that "We are still worried about the 
disparity between what China says and what it is doing." 
(Jones 1993) Even the Department of Defense seems 
apprehensive of China. In February 1995 the Department of 
Defense Office of International Security Affairs published a 
report entitled United States Security Strategy for the East-
Asia Pacific Region. While the report did not come right out 
and say that China is a threat to Asia, it suggested as much. 
It warns: 
Although China's leaders insist that their military 
build-up is defensive and commensurate with China's 
overall growth, others in the region cannot be certain 
of China's intentions, particularly in this period of 
leadership transition. (DoD 1995) 
Not all China watchers use such tame words to describe 
their fear of China. In a statement prepared for the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Sven F. Kraemer, former 
director of the Arms Control National Security Council Staff 
1981-1987, argues that " ... China's imperial drive to be a 
regional and world power in economic and political terms 
continues, unchecked by democratic limits and too often 
appeased by foreign powers including the United States." Mr. 
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Kraemer also declared that China poses "a range of potential 
threats to America's security," citing China's growing 
nuclear capability and military modernization. Even former 
ambassador to Beijing, James R. Lilley, warns that "the 
danger of what we have on the question of China's military is 
that people are beginning to make the case that China is 
benign." (Tyler 1995) 
The "China threat theory" is not only espoused by 
conservatives in the United States, it is also advocated by 
analysts throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The President 
of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Mineo Nakajima, 
insists that the threat posed by China has prompted a new 
cold war. Nakajima states, "It is understandable that the 
United States feels that China is a threat in its defense 
posture. I think a new cold war between China and the United 
States has already begun in Asia." (Kiyono 1995) A White 
Paper released by Australia in 1994 also provides an 
apprehensive assessment of China growing military capability. 
It notes that "China is likely to continue to pursue its 
strategic objectives by a combination of diplomatic, 
political and economic means, underpinned by its growing 
military strength." In summary, the paper declares that " 
. we recognize that the security environment could 
deteriorate, perhaps quite seriously in the future." (White 
Paper quoted in McBeth 1994) 
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In light of the perceived "China Threat" some analysts 
are calling for a policy of containment. Charles Krauthammer 
of the Washington Post endorses this approach. Last year 
Krauthammer wrote of the need to resist China "as it tries 
relentlessly to expand its reach." (Chapman 1996) Krauthammer 
is joined by Gideon Rachman in his call for a containment 
policy asserting that: 
The debate over 'containing China' has begun--and not a 
moment too soon. If it means acknowledging openly that 
China is a destabilizing force in Asia and that the 
other powers in the Pacific need to coordinate their 
responses to growing Chinese power, then containment is 
what is needed. (Rachman 1996) 
Not all U.S. policymakers and China analysts believe 
China poses an immediate threat to the Asia-Pacific region. 
One China expert, Karl W. Eikenberry says: 
In the time frame that does matter in security issues 
relating to potential challengers, perhaps 15 years into 
the future, the PRC is unlikely to disrupt the 
equilibrium in East Asia. (Eikenberry 1995) 
Eikenberry is one of the few sources that directly disputes 
the "China threat," instead most warn of a self-fufilling 
prophesy. That is to say, while China may not be a threat 
now, it may become one if we are not careful. If China feels 
its interests are threatened and the rest of the world is 
attempting to encircle and contain it, China may become 
aggressive towards it neighbors and possibly even the United 
States. 
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In order to prevent a self-fufilling prophesy, a number 
of experts believe that the best policy for China is one of 
engagement. Some proponents of engagement are Admiral Joseph 
W. Prueher, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Winston 
Lord, Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, and 
David M. Lampton, President of the National Committee on 
U.S.- China Relations. 
China, not surprisingly, also has been attempting to 
refute the "China threat theory." Liu Huaqing recently wrote 
an observer article responding to the "China threat theory." 
Liu is currently the PLA's most senior military officer, 
serving as the senior Vice Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC) . He is the final authority on decisions 
that match China's defense strategy and its R&D and 
acquisition priorities. (Wilhelm 1996) Observer articles are 
occasionally used by PRC leaders to convey their stance on 
important issues. In the article, Liu refers to both the 
priority of economic modernization and the importance of a 
strong defense in realizing that priority. 
. . with a strong national defense, we can both win 
and prevent a war, discouraging an enemy from taking 
reckless action ... (our) wish (is to) have a prosperous 
country and strong army, to revitalize the Chinese 
nation and to effect economic take off. (Huaqing 1993) 
Ching Pao quotes Huaqing as saying, "China will never pursue 
hegemonism, but must guard against U.S. efforts to interfere 
in China; China is USA's main enemy." (Ching Pao 1994) In 
addition to speeches and articles, Chinese leaders published 
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a White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament. The paper was 
released in an effort to make Chinese motives more 
transparent to its nervous neighbors and westerners. It 
professes that "China's national defense policy is defensive 
in nature" and that "the task of first importance facing the 
Chinese people is to develop the economy and change the 
poverty and backwardness of the nations." Finally, the paper 
assures that "China's national defense building is not 
directed against any country, and thus, does not pose a 
threat to any country." (Xinhua 1995) 
Faced with these two views on China's potential threat 
to Asia, this thesis will examine the modernization of 
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and assess its nature 
and purpose. The research will clarify the current military 
situation and shed light on China's intentions. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
The primary question that this thesis will attempt to 
answer is as follows: "To what extent is China's military 
modernization program intended to promote internal stability 
and economic growth and to what extent is it intended to 
create a force capable of achieving regional hegemony through 
force or the threat of force?" 
I hypothesize that China's military modernization is 
primarily intended to promote domestic stability and economic 
growth. This hypothesis is complicated, however, by the fact 
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that China considers Taiwan and the South China Sea part of 
its sovereign territory. While I do not believe that China 
will attempt to achieve regional hegemony outside of its 
claimed sovereign territory in the near future, it is 
possible that the PLA will commit acts of aggression against 
Taiwan if provoked by a Taiwan independence movement or 
increased U.S. commitments to Taiwan. In the South China 
Sea, China will most likely attempt to gain/maintain 
influence by peaceful means. Random minor acts of aggression 
may occur if China feels that its interests in the region are 
being violated. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
This thesis will be divided into five chapters with each 
examining a different component of PLA modernization. In 
each chapter, I will attempt to determine the primary goal of 
PLA modernization. This chapter has defined the "China 
threat theory," presenting both sides of the argument. The 
next chapter will explore several possible reasons for PLA 
modernization and attempt to determine the priority that 
China places on its military modernization in relation to 
other modernizations (agricultural, industrial and research & 
development) . 
Chapter III will analyze the PLA's economic activities. 
In allowing the military to operate a wide range of 
businesses the PRC makes a significant trade-off. PLA 
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business ventures both help to fund modernization and to 
stimulate the Chinese economy. At the same time, however, 
they endanger efforts to professionalize the officer corps. 
The government's willingness to allow these activities to 
continue may indicate that it places a higher priority on 
economic growth than professionalization of the military. 
In Chapter IV, I will examine the steps that China is 
taking to modernize its forces. Since the late 1970s and 
especially since 1989, China has realized the importance of 
research and development (R&D) in creating and maintaining a 
modern force. It has therefore placed an emphasis on 
obtaining new technologies and educating its scientists and 
engineers in the West. Other elements of PLA modernization 
include the education and training of troops, restructuring 
of forces, and the acquisition of new weapon systems. Each 
of these elements will be discussed in detail in order to 
determine the primary goal of modernization. A review of 
specific weapon systems purchased by the military over the 
last several years will be especially useful in determining 
whether China is primarily concerned with defense of the 
motherland or obtaining regional hegemony through force or 
threat of force. 
Chapter V will explore force utilization over the last 
few years and current exercise activity in each of China's 
seven military regions (MR) . I will study both Chinese 
aggression and military exercises in four locations: the 
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South China Sea, the waters surrounding Taiwan, Xinjiang 
Province and the Tibet Autonomous Region. I will conclude in 
Chapter VI with a discussion of the implications of China's 
military modernization and recommendations for U.S. 
policymakers. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
In writing this thesis I analyzed numerous sources on 
PLA modernization. The majority of my sources were taken 
from Lexis-Nexis and the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) . Information taken from these two sources 
include newspaper articles, transcripts of Congressional 
hearings, translations of speeches given by Chinese leaders 
and translations of official Chinese documents. I also 
examined articles from magazines such as Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Jane's Defense Weekly, Asia Defense Journal and 
Jane's Intelligence Review. Reports published by the Center 
for Naval Analysis (CNA) , the RAND Corporation and the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies were also 
reviewed. Finally, I conducted interviews with China experts 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
Department of the Army and the State Department. 
1 0 
D. RELEVANCE 
As we prepare to enter the 21st Century, the Asia-
Pacific region occupies a prominent place in U.S. policy and 
security strategy. Economic ties between the United States 
and the nations of Asia make it of vital national interest to 
promote growth and maintain security in the region. In the 
post-Cold War era, many countries in the region fear that a 
power vacuum exists and that the People's Republic of China 
is preparing to fill this void. China's booming economy has 
enabled it to embark on a military modernization program. A 
modern military may give China the capability to seek 
regional hegemony, by force if necessary. It is, therefore, 
important to determine whether China is modernizing its 
military only as a means to promote economic growth and 
internal stability or whether it intends to use it to seek 
regional hegemony through intimidation and force. 
1 1 
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II. BASIS FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will explore several possible reasons for 
PLA modernization and will attempt to determine the priority 
that China places on its military modernization in relation 
to economic modernizations. I will argue that China's 
military modernization program has been reemphasized five 
times during the last two decades based on perceived changes 
to China's security environment. I will also submit that the 
primary objective of military modernization is to address 
national defense and internal stability concerns and that in 
China's national modernization plan economic growth takes 
priority over military modernization. Finally, I will assert 
that, all these factors considered, China's military 
modernization is not primarily intended to achieve regional 
hegemony through force or threat of force but to enhance 
economic growth and internal stability. It is important, 
however, to remember that China considers Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and the South China Sea part of China. By definition, 
therefore, China's internal stability includes these areas. 
B. HISTORY 
First and foremost, modernization of the PLA is an 
integral part of an overall reform program first announced by 
Zhou Enlai in 1975. The program has received new emphasis 
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several times in the last two decades as a result of both 
wartime and peacetime experiences including Deng Xiaoping's 
rise to power, China's 1979 war with Vietnam, China's 1985 
change in military strategy, the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War between the United States and Iraq. 
An examination of the history of military modernization 
efforts will discuss each of these events and their impact on 
China's modernization program. 
1. Four Modernizations 
In 1975, a new strategy for national development and 
security was announced by China's Premier Zhou Enlai. The 
strategy, termed "the Four Modernizations", was intended to 
build China into a modern and powerful country by the year 
2000. In a speech to Communist Party members Zhou laid out 
the modernizations required for a comprehensive reform of 
society. These reforms, in order of priority, were in 
agriculture, industry, science & technology and defense. 
(Wilhelm 1996) It is important to note that defense was the 
fourth and last priority in the modernization strategy. Zhou 
believed that adoption of the "Four Modernizations" would 
ensure China's long-range security. In view of China's 
history of great suffering and humiliation at the hands of 
imperialists, security was a top priority for the PRC 
government. According to Weixing Hu, "Chinese leaders tend 
to use this historical sense of vulnerability as the driving 
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force for the modernization campaign." (Hu 1995) In spite of 
Zhou's announcement, the "Four Modernizations" campaign did 
not receive real emphasis until 1978, three years after 
Zhou's death, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. 
As the "Four Modernizations" campaign indicates, the PRC 
"pursues a national strategy with economic construction at 
the core." (Kayahara 1995) While China's economy is 
experiencing an unprecedented boom, most of the country 
(particularly the interior) remains backward and undeveloped. 
The stated goal of Chinese leaders is to develop a prosperous 
and stable China. In order to achieve this goal, "a peaceful 
international environment is necessary .... A prosperous and 
stable China, in turn, will increasingly benefit world 
peace." (Xinhua 1995) 
2. Deng' s Rise to Power and Vietnam 
As Zhou's protege, Deng Xiaoping favored the "Four 
Modernizations" program. At the Third Plenary Session of the 
11th CPC Central Committee, Deng officially adopted the "Four 
Modernizations" as the program that would drive China from 
its backward state into the modern era. The decision was 
reinforced by the war with Vietnam the following year. 
In late 1978, Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, 
invaded Cambodia and toppled Pol Pot's Chinese-backed forces. 
In response to this Vietnamese aggression, China invaded 
Vietnam. Since the Vietnamese army was already engaged with 
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Cambodian forces on its southwestern border, the invasion by 
China forced it to fight on two fronts. The People's 
Liberation Army seemed to have the advantage by virtue of its 
overwhelming size and the two-front nature of Vietnam's war. 
The Vietnamese army, however, was the most combat-experienced 
army in Asia. For decades it had fought wars against France 
and later the United States. It was not only more 
experienced than the PLA, but it also proved more mobile and 
technologically advanced. As a result, the Vietnamese 
successfully resisted the Chinese, inflicting high casualties 
on the invading army. The defeat shocked the Chinese 
leadership, especially Deng. According to one observer: 
The magnitude of the PLA's losses was a humbling and 
compelling argument for reform ... not only the military 
but China's entire infrastructure required reform. The 
Chinese did not have the technological industrial 
capability to build the modern military equipment 
needed, couldn't afford to buy it on the foreign market, 
and did not have the military education and training 
system to effectively use it ... Both the nation's and the 
PLA's infrastructure had to be overhauled. (Wilhelm 
1996) 
By the 1979, Chinese leaders were more than ready to 
implement the "Four Modernizations" program first proffered 
by Zhou Enlai four years earlier. 
3. Shift in Defense Strategy 
The "Four Modernizations" program continued at a 
moderate pace through the early 1980s. During this time, 
economic growth was the driving factor behind China's efforts 
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with an understanding that successful military modernization 
could be accomplished only in a prosperous China. 
It was not until 1985 that the PRC augmented the "Four 
Modernizations" with a change in military strategy. 
Traditionally, the PRC viewed the prospects of a world war as 
inevitable. By the mid-1980s, however, China began to 
believe that it would not be faced with a major war with 
either superpower in the near term. This combined with an 
improvement in relations with Russia, India and Vietnam, 
China's traditional enemies, led to a change in military 
strategy. (Hu 1995) 
Since the inception of Communist rule, China had 
followed Mao's concept of 'People's War.' The objective of 
'People's War' was to fight a long, protracted, land war 
emphasizing large land maneuvers. The PLA would draw the 
enemy onto Chinese territory at which point the entire 
population, mobilized for war, would participate. The 
adversary would be consumed by the Chinese masses. The 
Chinese believed that they would eventually win this type of 
war based on attrition of enemy forces. In light of the 
changed security environment, however, the concept of 
'People's War' no longer seemed suitable. 
The consensus among Chinese leadership was that China's 
future wars, at least in the near term, would be local wars. 
Under this assumption, Deng changed China's strategy from one 
of 'People's War' to 'People's War under Modern Conditions.' 
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Local wars would be geographically confined, short conflicts 
breaking out abruptly on China's periphery. Speed and 
surprise are characteristic of this type of warfare making 
imperative a well-trained military as well as lethality and 
variability of weapons. (Hu 1995) Admiral Liu Huaqing, the 
PLA's most senior military officer and former head of the PLA 
Navy (PLAN), describes the PLA's role as being "to fight 
modern warfare under-high tech conditions ... (with) the 
adoption of the new strategy (being) significant in the PLA's 
modernization program" (Quoted in Ji 1995) 
4. Post-Cold War 
The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War 
was important in several respects. First, it reinforced 
China's new military strategy. Second, the fall of the 
Soviet Union led to the realization among Chinese leaders 
that the new military strategy is dependent on sustained 
economic growth. The Soviet Union made the mistake of 
putting the "gun above the butter," placing more emphasis on 
military might rather than promoting a well-rounded national 
strength built from the ground up. (Ji 1995) Finally, the 
end of the Cold War markedly improved China's security 
environment. 
Since the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s, Russia 
had been considered a major military threat. Both the 
Chinese and the Soviets had large numbers of troops stationed 
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along the Sino-Russian border in anticipation of a major 
conflict. However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, a 
conflict of this nature was deemed improbable. Not only was 
the Russian threat reduced, China also had established 
favorable relations with South Korea and many other Asian 
nations. The peaceful post-Cold War environment enabled China 
to concentrate on rapid economic development and to continue 
to raise the quality of its armed forces. ,The PLA shifted 
from a wartime mentality to one of peacetime construction. 
(Xinhua 1995) As one scholar notes, Deng believed that it 
was uno longer necessary for the PLA to stay at wartime 
readiness and to monopolize resources that could be put to 
use by the civilian sector." (Henley 1988) While military 
modernization has always been the fourth priority in China's 
military modernization program, the end of the Cold War 
allowed the country to put an even greater emphasis on its 
economic modernization programs than was previously possible. 
(Hu 1995) The booming economy, in turn, can support a modest 
military modernization program. 
5. The Persian Gulf War 
The latest event to have an impact on China's military 
modernization program was the Gulf War between the United 
States (and allies) and Iraq. Many PLA generals and 
commanders were astounded by the swift outcome of the War. 
Iraqi forces were seen as similar in character to China's own 
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forces. The Iraqi's fought with uweapons and equipment that 
in many cases replicated those employed by Chinese forces 
today." (Godwin 1994) As a result, PLA leaders carefully 
studied the war, publishing many of their conclusions. The 
technological proficiency of American weapons and the rapid 
defeat of Iraqi forces highlighted the necessity of upgrading 
the PLA's weapons, the majority of which are based on 1960s 
and 1970s technology. (Hu 1995) The conflict was seen by 
many Chinese military experts as the epitome of modern 
warfare. 
War was unexpected, fought for limited political 
objectives, conducted as a combined arms campaign using 
all resources from space systems to riflemen, fought by 
extremely well trained troops using high-technology 
weapons and equipment, fought with great speed and 
lethality. (Godwin 1994) 
The Chinese see this type of war as the inevitable pattern of 
future armed conflict. As a result, the PLA's leadership has 
deemed that the nation should prepare for the high-tech 
warfare of the next century. (Ji 1995) The realization that 
the PLA, in its current condition, would not be able to fight 
successfully these future high-tech wars was expressed in 
March 1993 at a meeting of the National People's Congress. 
Military leaders expressed their concern in the matter 
stating that uwithout the support of high technology, the 
army can hardly win a war fought under modern conditions." 
(Bitzinger and Gill 1996) 
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China's leaders realize that a high-tech military can 
not be supported without a strong economic base and an 
advanced research and development foundation supporting a 
high-tech industrial sector. They also realize that 
education and training in these high-tech domains are 
essential to a modern military. For these reasons the 
economic modernization must take priority over military 
modernization. 
C. NATIONAL DEFENSE 
In the post-Cold War era, China shares its border with 
14 nations. ·Even though the PRC has improved relations with 
most of its neighbors in the last decade, there are still a 
few minor border disputes which may be perceived as a threat 
to China's territorial integrity. China's change in defense 
strategy from one anticipating a major war to one in which 
local and subregional border wars dominate require it to 
place enormous emphasis on self defense. For this reason, 
the PLA must be first and foremost a continental defense 
force. 
The PLA's emphasis on self defense is not a new concept. 
China has always claimed a strategy of defense. Most 
recently, the official policy is one of 'positive defense.' 
The stated goals of the policy are to "consolidate national 
defense, resist foreign aggression, defend the national 
sovereignty over its territory, territorial waters and air 
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space as well as its maritime rights and interests, and 
safeguard national unity and security." (Xinhua 1995) China, 
therefore, claims that the modernization of its military is 
primarily in support of these goals, stating that its 
"defense building is not directed against any country." 
(Xinhua 1995) It is not surprising that the Chinese are 
concerned about foreign aggression and defense of China's 
sovereign territory. Historically, China has been subjected 
to foreign belligerence, especially in the century between 
the Opium War and the end of World War II, which are 
remembered as China's "hundred years of shame." 
D. TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
Associated with China's national defense is the issue of 
territorial disputes between China and its neighbors. The 
two most prominently disputed areas are Taiwan (including the 
Taiwan Straits) and the Spratly Islands in the South China 
Sea. Beijing's military strategic concern is focused on 
territorial issues in both of these regions. 
As Mao Zedong and the Communists entered Beijing, nearly 
50 years ago, the Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek fled to 
the island of Formosa (Taiwan) . Since that time, the 
governments of both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) 
claim to be the legitimate ruler of China. Although there 
have been clashes between the two, neither has ever attempted 
to claim itself as independent of the other. In the past 
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decade, the PRC seemed to be content with the status-quo. 
Mutual trade ties have been established and contact between 
the two sides has been at a record high. Both sides still 
subscribed to a "One China" policy, hoping for an eventual 
resolution of their differences and a reunification of the 
two sides. 
In the 1990s, however, the status-quo has been 
threatened. As its power waned, the Kuomintang (KMT) in 
Taiwan lifted martial law and the ban on political parties. 
In response to these new freedoms and encouraged by the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, an independence movement formed 
in Taiwan, threatening the integrity of "One China." (Hu 
1995) The PRC still views Taiwan as Chinese territory and 
any move toward Taiwanese independence is considered a threat 
to China. Not only would an independent Taiwan destroy any 
hopes of a reunification, I would also argue that it may 
result in a domino effect. Ethnic minorities in Tibet and 
Xinjiang may attempt to follow Taiwan's lead. Although not 
supported by the majority of Taiwanese citizens, the 
independence movement has spurred hostilities between the two 
Chinas. 
China also feels threatened by Taiwan's recent purchase 
of arms from abroad. Specifically, the purchase of F-16s 
from the United States and Mirage 2000s from France concerns 
Chinese leaders. The addition of modern military technology 
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to Taiwan's already robust inventory is perceived as directed 
at the PRC. 
The South China Sea is also a territory in dispute. 
Traditionally, China has claimed rights to the South China 
Sea to include its island reefs and maritime space. Since 
the 1970s many of the Nansha (Spratly) Islands have also been 
claimed, in part or whole, by six other nations. The 
controversy surrounding the islands has heightened since the 
islands were identified as potentially oil and gas rich. 
(Studeman 1996) 
The Taiwan Strait and South China Sea disputes are both 
considerations in China's military modernization. In each 
area China feels that its territorial integrity may be 
threatened, but does not possess the military capability to 
ensure successful resolution to either problem if deemed 
necessary. The PLA is hindered by its inability to sustain 
forces for any great length of time and by its lack of power 
projection capability. These inadequacies can only be solved 
by building a modern military. 
E. INTERNAL INSTABILITY 
China's concerns are not limited to national defense and 
territorial disputes; domestic problems plague it as well. 
The gravest threat to China's internal stability is presented 
by internal opponents to the regime. Ethnic minorities in 
Tibet and Xinjiang periodically rise up against the 
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government in Beijing. A book written in China without 
official approval, "Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?" 
claims that these forces have been more active in recent 
years under the influence of "hostile western elements". 
(JPRS 1994) In Xinjiang about 60% of the population is non-
Chinese (non-Han) and in Tibet almost 95% of the permanent 
population is non-Chinese. (Hu 1995) As a result, neither 
feels a strong ethnic tie to China or the Chinese people. 
Tibet was essentially autonomous from Beijing's 
political control until the early 1950s when Chinese forces 
began occupying the region. In 1959 the Dalai Lama, Tibet's 
spiritual leader, was driven into exile. For the last 40 
years activist forces in Tibet along with those in exile have 
been lobbying the international community for the return of 
their national sovereignty. 
Xinjiang, while territorially part of China, is 
ethnically and culturally closer to the former Central Asian 
Republics of the Soviet Union and to Turkey. The break-up of 
the Soviet Union gave new hope to the ethnic minorities in 
Xinjiang, inciting independence forces in the region. In 
addition to arousing separatist forces in western China, the 
newly independent nations in Central Asia, specifically 
Kazakstan, have also made territorial claims on the Chinese 
government. (JPRS 1994) Political instability and ethnic 
tensions in these areas also threaten to spill into China. 
(Hu 1995) 
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Opposition closer to Beijing, in the form of pro-
democracy advocates, also has caused problems for the Chinese 
government in recent years. In 1989, the Tiananmen Square 
demonstration embarrassed the government during a state visit 
by Mikhail Gorbachev. Subsequently, military actions against 
the peaceful demonstrators induced international rebuke. 
Since the massacre, China has been subject to repeated 
attacks and economic sanctions based on its human rights 
record. 
While the external threat to China has diminished in the 
last decade, the influence of western ideology is perceived 
as an increasing threat to the nation's domestic stability. 
In spite of growing economic and military power, China 
remains a weak state politically. Chinese leaders feel 
vulnerable to external threats against the nations 
ideological base and political institutions. (Hu 1995) As 
long as China remains a Communist nation, it must rely on the 
state police backed by a strong military to maintain internal 
cohesion. 
F. CONCLUSION 
China has a long and glorious past in which its 
emperors' rule was justified by the "mandate of heaven." At 
the same time, vassal states viewed China with great respect. 
In the 19th century, however, China's status changed. 
Foreign influence in China's internal affairs led to a 
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"hundred years of shame" for the Chinese people. It is, 
therefore, only natural that China's leaders are wary of 
foreign intervention in the country's internal affairs. 
China's wish to become, once again, a respected and 
influential entity in Asia is also understandable. However, 
this does not mean that China is modernizing its army in 
order to gain regional hegemony by force or threat of force. 
China's modernization program is intended primarily to 
promote economic development. Its guide, the "Four 
Modernizations," stresses the importance of agriculture, 
industry and science and technology. Military modernization 
is also viewed as important, but is of lower priority than 
economic modernization. China can only attain a position of 
status and respect in the international community by 
developing comprehensive national strength. In addition to 
military modernizations, it must evolve economically and 
politically. Today, a nation's power is largely determined 
by its economic strength and political connections. China 
must strive to continue its economic growth and cultivate 
relations with both its neighbors and the west. 
The analysis conducted in this chapter indicates that 
China's military modernization program has been repeatedly 
emphasized over the last two decades in response to changes 
in the security environment. It also appears to reveal that 
PLA modernization is aimed predominately at defending China 
from both internal and external threats. The rise in defense 
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spending between 1991 and 1996 seems to be in response to 
perceived threats to China's internal stability. China fears 
that Taiwan and the ethnic minorities in western China will 
attempt to separate themselves from the PRC. This fear 
probably became more accute after the break-up of the Soviet 
Union when former Soviet Republics gained independence. 
China also perceives a threat to its interests in the South 
China Sea. It may feel that other claimants are attempting 
to crowd China out of the region. Subsequent chapters will 
more closely analyze the modernization activities of the PLA 
in order to determine whether the facts bear out these 
conclusions. It is important to note, however, that while 
China may be modernizing its forces for defensive purposes, 
many of the weapon systems it has obtained can be used both 
defensively and offensively. Intent may change overnight, 
but weapons systems cannot. 
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III. PLA ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, China has become the world's 
third largest investor in national defense, with spending 
estimated at between $18 and $25 billion a year. (Oliver 
1994) Not surprisingly, the Central Government in Beijing is 
unable to support a budget of this magnitude. In fact, the 
government only contributes $7 billion a year to defense. 
The remainder of the budget is funded by other government 
sources along with a multibillion dollar corporate empire 
controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 
This chapter will trace the evolution of the PLA's vast 
business empire, which has a hand in almost every commercial 
sector, from military hardware to washing machines. According 
to Uli Schmetzer of the Chicago Tribune, "There is no sphere 
of commerce in which the PLA does not have a finger or a 
whole hand." (Schmetzer 1994) Although impossible to name 
every PLA enterprise, I will highlight three particularly 
successful corporations: Polytechnology, Xinxing and North 
Industries Corporation. I also will examine briefly the 
PLA's role in Hong Kong and consider the implications of 
post-1997 Chinese rule therein. 
While the success of PLA enterprises brings in billions 
of yuan each year, the empire is not without its problems. 
Government officials fear that commercialization is skewing 
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PLA priorities, impeding attempts to professionalize the 
armed forces and promoting corruption in the organization. 
In view of these problems, Jiang Zemin and the Central 
Military Commission are attempting to reassert control over 
the PLA and its business empire. This chapter will identify 
a few of the more serious problems the PLA faces and address 
government attempts to control the PLA's business empire. I 
would argue that if China's intent is to build a military 
capable of obtaining regional hegemony by force or threat of 
force, it must place emphasis on military professionalization 
rather than economic gain. It also must emphasize production 
of military vice civilian goods. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The PLA's business venture began in the decades 
preceding the Chinese Revolution. China's central government 
often was unable to deliver needed supplies to military units 
scattered across the country. In order to survive, soldiers 
were forced to depend on their own resources for food and 
clothing. Farms and factories were procured to meet these 
needs. (Bickford 1994) PLA involvement in economic 
activities during the revolutionary period (1949) served to 
ease the economic burden on the local populations. The army 
could bear most of the cost of feeding and clothing its 
soldiers. As a result, the military gained the goodwill and 
support of the people. After the 1949 Revolution, the army 
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maintained control of its farming and industrial systems. 
From 1958-1976, Maoist doctrine encouraged the PLA to 
continue these activities. Their business ventures were seen 
as essential to maintaining the army's readiness level, but 
were never meant to be 'for profit' enterprises. 
The 'not for profit' philosophy would change upon Mao 
ZeDong's death in 1976. Deng Xiaoping implemented radical 
reforms throughout China. Deng rid China of many Maoist 
constraints in an attempt to modernize China's economy. The 
removal of these restraints allowed the PLA to move into 
activities that were previously off-limits to the 
organization. (Joffe 1995) Over the next few decades, the 
PLA expanded its sector of involvement to include defense-
related industries. The technologies developed and hardware 
produced were both for use at home and for sale abroad. 
Involvement in business was especially attractive to PLA 
leaders since all profits increased the financial strength of 
the army. During the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, 
energies were redirected toward the manufacturing goods for 
civilian use. Factories that originally turned out tanks now 
produce motorcycles; former missile factories make 
refrigerators. (Country Forecast 1994) 
The decision to convert production from military to 
civilian goods was made possible both by Deng's reforms and a 
new international climate. Deng's reforms created a demand 
for advanced technology and specialists, both of which were 
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readily available in the military-industrial complex. At· the 
same time, China experienced a changed security environment. 
The Soviet Union was no longer considered the security threat 
it had been in the past. As a result, Deng decided to give 
economic development priority over military modernization. 
Production priorities in military industries were shifted to 
civilian goods. By the early 1990s, 66-76% of total 
production by military industries was for the civilian 
market; in contrast, only 8% of total output in 1979 was 
devoted to this market. (Joffe 1995) Today, according to the 
Far Eastern Economic Review, the five largest defense 
enterprises employ almost 200,000 workers. These plants 
produce a range of goods from space launchers and aero-
engines to sports bicycles and cigarette-making machines. 
(Far Eastern Economic Review 1993) 
It is estimated that the PLA currently runs over 20,000 
enterprises, 75 percent of which were converted from military 
to civilian production. (Schmetzer 1994) Today, commercial 
ventures are integral to the maintenance of China's three 
million member army. The commercial empire's scope far 
exceeds the military sphere as it fully participates in both 
domestic and international markets. 
C. TYPES OF ENTERPRISES 
PLA enterprises fall into three general categories: 
corporations controlled by PLA leadership at the national 
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level, businesses run by individual military units and joint 
ventures. "All three types are self-run and assume sole 
responsibility for profits and losses." (Bickford 1994) In 
addition to these categories, the PLA also receives some 
income from industries that fall under the control of China's 
State Council or Cabinet. (Holberton and Walker 1994) 
Industries in this final category are removed from the daily 
tasks of the PLA and do not involve participation from PLA 
officers and soldiers. It is, however, believed that some of 
the profits from such industries are funneled back to the 
PLA. (Joffe 1995) 
1. National Level Enterprises 
At the national level, most PLA enterprises are run by 
the General Logistics Department (GLD) . The remainder are 
controlled by either the General Staff Headquarters or the 
General Political Department. The list of corporations and 
businesses controlled at the national level are too extensive 
to review in this thesis. I will, however, give a brief 
description of three of the more significant PLA enterprises; 
China Polytechnology, China Xinxing Corporation and China 
North Industries Group (NORINCO) . 
China Polytechnology, also known as the Poly Group, is 
the most extensive entity in the PLA's commercial empire. 
Not surprisingly, the headquarters for the PLA's commercial 
empire is located in Poly Plaza. Poly Group is owned by the 
33 
PLA General Staff and run by Major-General He Ping, son-in-
law of Deng Xiaoping. (Holberton and Walker 1994) Selling 
weapons from existing stockpiles, Poly Group has become the 
primary arms exporter for the PLA. This is a significant 
contribution considering that arms sales are the largest 
single source of extra-budgetary income for the army. 
(Bickford 1994) Poly is also the aviation purchasing arm for 
the government, even acquiring airplanes and helicopters from 
the United States. (Market Report 1995) The corporation does 
not stop at military sales and purchases. It also is 
involved in electronics, shipping finance, real estate and 
telecommunications. Possibly the most aggressive of the PLA 
enterprises, "Poly Group is well on its way to becoming one 
of China's biggest conglomerates." (Holberton and Walker 
1994) 
Another flourishing PLA enterprise is the China Xinxing 
Corporation. Owned by the General Logistics Department, 
Xinxing is a conglomerate of firms that produce a wide 
variety of products. The enterprise was originally a trading 
company responsible for supplying uniforms and food to the 
army. In 1991 it became a conglomerate that officially 
claims around 100 subsidiaries. Xinxing boasts a diversity 
of activities which range from speculating in Hong Kong real 
estate to creating designer clothing. (Goodspeed 1994) Its 
primary interest, however, is the production and sales of 
pharmaceuticals through its sister organization, 999 
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enterprise. A growing corporation, "Xinxing has (even) 
established offices abroad, including one in Hong Kong." 
(Holberton and Walker 1994) 
China's North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) is also a 
major source of income for the PLA. NORINCO, a product of 
the Fifth Ministry of Machine Building, like Xinxing is 
involved in a broad range of activities. It is immersed in 
construction, real estate, manufacturing, finance, trading 
and arms sales. One of the few organizations allowed to 
raise capital abroad, NORINCO holds a prized position among 
Chinese corporations and is certain to continue its 
contribution to the PLA into the 21st century. (Holberton and 
Walker 1994) 
These corporations are by no means all-inclusive of 
businesses run at the national level. The PLA also runs a 
network of approximately three hundred hospitals and four 
medical colleges; is the largest manufacturer of satellite 
dishes in China; and is estimated to own more than 80% of 
production in aviation, aerospace, nuclear, electronic, 
shipping and weaponry sectors. (Cheung 1995) Suffice to say, 
PLA nationally controlled industries include an immense range 
of goods, services and technologies. 
The Air Force and Navy are also involved in economic 
endeavors which contribute to the military budget. Each is 
particularly well-suited, not to mention well-placed, to take 
advantage of large scale operations in its area of expertise. 
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The Air Force, for example, owned 23 large and medium sized 
airports in 1993. These airports cater to both the civilian 
and military population. In addition, the Air Force runs 
China United Airlines which was flying 39 domestic routes by 
1992. (Joffe 1995) 
The Navy has established a shipping fleet that contracts 
out merchant ships for civilian cargo. (Joffe 1995) It also 
controls many of the harbors along China's eastern coast. 
(Far Eastern Economic Review 1993) This is especially 
profitable considering the amount of trade the nation 
conducts on a daily basis. 
2. Regional and Unit Level Enterprises 
Many successful PLA businesses are also run at the 
regional or unit level. A trading company associated with 
the Chengdu Military Region exports products to more than a 
hundred regions and countries, "becoming one of the top 
foreign exchange earners for the PLA." (Bickford 1994) 
Another successful regional enterprise is Changcheng (Great 
Wall) Industrial Conglomerate. The Guangzhou-based 
enterprise is owned by the 42nd Group Army and operates 
approximately 90 enterprises. (Joffe 1995) Various military 
regions also own and run a variety of hotels, guest houses 
and souvenir shops. Farming, food processing and construction 
also take place at the local level. 
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Some military backed enterprises are tied to one of 
China's Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Enterprises in these 
areas often receive special incentives such as tax breaks. 
Ten percent of the officially acknowledged PLA enterprises 
operate in the Guangdong SEZ thus receiving special 
treatment. (Far Eastern Economic Review 1993) Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone also has its share of military-run 
businesses. The 999 Enterprise Group combines all thirty-
four companies operating under the General Logistics 
Department in the Zone. According to Joffe, foreign sales 
for 999 alone were estimated at $12 million in 1993. Trade 
companies in the group market their goods in Russia, Sudan, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Egypt and Qatar. (Joffe 1995) 
3 • Joint Ventures 
Expansion into less traditional sectors of production 
has increased the amount of contact PLA leadership and its 
business managers have with foreigners and foreign firms. As 
a result, many joint ventures have been pursued. Currently, 
the PLA is a party in more than 200 joint ventures with 
domestic and foreign firms. (Akita 1995) Joint ventures are 
most abundant in the Special Economic Zones of Zhanjiang in 
Canton and Zhuhai near Macao. They are not, however, limited 
to these areas. Inner Mongolia is also a point of 
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contention. In this area, Mercedes-Benz produces trucks and 
Siemens of Germany makes telecommunications equipment. 
(Schmetzer 1994) Similar ventures with U.S. and Japanese 
companies also contribute to the PLA's massive empire. Joint 
ventures on a much smaller scale also exist. One example is 
China's joint venture garages. Large, well-equipped 
maintenance garages found throughout the provinces are often 
jointly owned with foreign partners from Singapore, Taiwan or 
Hong Kong. (Market Report 1995) 
D. DRAWBACKS OF COMMERCIALIZATION 
While it is unclear exactly how much money the PLA's 
commercial empire brings in annually, estimates of $5 billion 
seem reasonable. (Economist 1994) Some experts even estimate 
that military-backed enterprises generate revenue matching 
the defense budget. (Far Eastern Economic Review 1993) Cut-
backs in the defense budget have made this source of income 
vital to the continuing support of the three million member 
army. However, the PLA's commercial empire does not come 
without drawbacks. While most of the income generated from 
PLA businesses goes toward improving food and living 
standards for soldiers and remodeling the military, the rest 
is either plowed back into the big commercial enterprises or 
pocketed by managers. These activities could lead to 
corruption which in turn might degrade attempts to 
professionalize the PLA. 
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The commercialization of PLA has both military and 
government officials concerned. Soldiers seem more 
interested in turning a profit than in protecting the 'mother 
land. ' Instead of selling arms to insurgents on the basis of 
ideology, PLA enterprises are increasingly only motivated by 
profit. The PLA's capitalist spirit undermines the Chinese 
government and the Communist Party. (Bickford 1994) 
Not only is the capitalist spirit contrary to communism, 
but it may endanger China's relations with the United States 
and hinder efforts to maintain Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
status. Recent arms deals with Pakistan and Iran are gaining 
unfavorable international attention. The Chinese are accused 
of selling two dozen M-11 missiles to Pakistan in 1993, 
enraging U.S. officials. (Asian Defense Journal 1993) While 
it is unclear what the PLA's position was in these weapons 
deals, one would expect it was a major player. 
In addition to undermining the Chinese government, the 
drive toward capitalism may also hinder the combat 
effectiveness of the world's largest army and endanger 
attempts at professionalization. According to Chong-Pin Lin, 
associate director of Chinese studies at the American 
Enterprise Institute, "the PLA's uncontrollable profit-
seeking activities ... will corrode its soldiers' combat 
spirit and weaken the effectiveness of operations." (Lin 
1994) 
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The PLA also faces the loss of its brightest young 
officers to civilian corporations. These officers gain 
valuable experience in business and finance while in the 
army. Instead of becoming career officers, they leave the 
army for better paying civilian jobs. 
Even corruption within the PLA is amplified by the 
organization's business aspirations. A lack of oversight by 
the central government has paved the way for fraud, smuggling 
rings and illegal enterprises. Corporations such as Xinxing, 
mentioned above, are required to give a specified percentage 
of their income to the General Logistics Department. In 
Xinxing's case, the "tribute" reportedly amounts to 30%. The 
remainder of the money is intended to support the unit that 
owns the enterprise. Officials believe that some of the PLA 
owned and operated enterprises are under reporting their 
income and using the extra funds to pay for luxury goods or 
bonuses for PLA officers and soldiers. In 1992 a GLD audit 
reportedly uncovered over 300 illegally opened bank accounts 
holding approximately Rmb 1 billion in unreported funds. (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 1993) 
Smuggling is also a problem for Chinese customs 
officials. Their job is certainly not made easier when the 
smugglers are PLA officers and soldiers or are being escorted 
by Navy ships. In the mid-1980s Chinese naval personnel 
colluded with Hainan Island officials to smuggle more than US 
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$500 million in Japanese automobiles and Televisions into 
mainland China. (Far Eastern Economic Review 1993) The navy 
has also been accused of smuggling more than 2,000 buses and 
cars into the country from Russia and South Korea. It 
reportedly used a gunboat to thwart customs officials. (Joffe 
1995) 
As a result of special treatment granted PLA 
enterprises, businesses with phony PLA credentials have been 
popping up in the provinces. The owners of these illegal 
businesses hope to enjoy a wide spectrum of preferential 
policies and generous tax breaks offered to PLA enterprises. 
(UPI 1995) The PLA receives special treatment in the area of 
trade as well. Although not allowed to trade strategic items 
other than military wares, they can apply to trade quota 
goods and freely trade most other goods. (China Hand 1995) 
This may lead to hard feelings between the PLA and 
traditional business owners. 
E. ATTEMPTS TO CURB PLA ACTIVITIES 
Government officials and PLA leaders, well aware of 
these problems, have been attempting to shut down or curb PLA 
business activities. In 1989 the Central Military Commission 
(CMC) banned individual units from engaging in "pure business 
operations." This was done in the form of the 'ten no's.' 
The 'ten no's' are regulations published in an attempt to 
prohibit the PLA from engaging in a variety of activities. 
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The effected activities were either illegal or considered 
contrary to professionalization of the army by the CMC. 
(Joffe 1995) Even though the Commission has attempted to 
enforce the ban, it has had little success. (Bickford 1994) 
Deng Xiaoping made matters even worse in a 1992 country tour. 
During the tour, Deng "came down again, forcefully and 
unequivocally, on the side of reforms and blasted leftist 
opponents." (Joffe 1995) Deng's statement only served to 
reinforce PLA behavior. It weakened opponents to the PLA's 
involvement in the economy, those who want to develop a 
professional army, and it gave the PLA the "green light" to 
intensify its economic activities. (Joffe 1995) 
Senior army commanders are also attempting to restrict 
large scale business to those at the regional military 
command level and those under the direct control of military 
authorities in Beijing. (Akita 1995) PLA leaders are even 
ordering active duty units from certain businesses. In June 
1994, the 27th Army of Shanxi was ordered to turn over PLA 
owned mines in the region to civilians. The unit was 
compensated 1.3 billion yuan by Beijing for giving up the 
mines. (South China Morning Post 1994) 
In an attempt to crack down on corruption, the Central 
Military Commission laid down guidelines for fiscal 
discipline and economic accountability. On 1 January 1995, 
the PLA Regulation on Auditing went into effect. The 
regulation provides for an auditing department to oversee the 
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activities of all PLA enterprises. (BBC 1995) The PLA's 
prominent position in the Chinese economy and its 
institutional interests in these business activities may make 
it difficult to manage. Government officials can only hope 
that these attempts to control the PLA and its vast 
industrial complex will succeed. 
F. HONG KONG 
Of final interest regarding the PLA's commercial 
activities is its relationship with Hong Kong. While PLA 
enterprises conduct business with Hong Kong and even own some 
prime real estate there, 1997 will open a new market to 
industrious PLA officials. In Hong Kong the PLA is currently 
only a sideline player, but it may soon move to center stage. 
Exactly how will this affect Hong Kong? No one really knows. 
The PLA must recognize the tremendous opportunity Hong Kong 
presents. It could reap billions of yuan from the huge 
plots of land that the British will leave behind. While the 
British have been relatively benign, the PLA may choose to 
develop old garrison land and muscle into the Hong Kong 
market. They may even consider themselves above the law and 
demand special privileges for their business interests. On 
the other hand, China may decide the best course of action in 
Hong Kong is a hands-off approach. I do not, however, 
believe that the PLA can control its capitalist urges. 
Unless restrained by the central government, the PLA is 
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likely to behave like the proverbial "kid in the candy shop" 
when it comes to Hong Kong. 
G. CONCLUSION 
In allowing the military to operate a wide range of 
businesses the PRC is making a significant trade-off. PLA 
ventures both help to fund modernization and to stimulate the 
Chinese economy. At the same time, however, they endanger 
efforts to professionalize the PLA. In addition, joint 
ventures between the PLA and foreign entities jeopardizes the 
central government's ability to control PLA forces. Senior 
PLA officials may not be willing to take military action 
against countries with which it has joint ventures and other 
economic ties even when ordered to by Beijing. Finally, the 
transition from military to civilian production is 
insightful. The government's willingness to allow these 
activities to continue seems to indicate that it places a 
higher priority on economic growth than the 
professionalization of its military. 
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IV. MODERNIZATION STRATEGY 
Since the late 1970s and especially since 1989, China 
has worked to create a modern military. The modernization 
process includes four key elements: education and training of 
troops, reorganization of forces, research and development 
(R&D) and the acquisition of new weapon systems. In this 
chapter each of these elements will be discussed in detail in 
order to determine the primary goal of modernization. A 
review of specific weapon systems purchased by the military 
over the last several years will be especially useful in 
determining whether China is primarily concerned with defense 
of the "motherland" or with obtaining regional hegemony 
through force or threat of force. 
A. EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
In order to compete in the 21st Century, China had to 
change radically requirements for recruiting and training 
both officers and enlisted personnel. Since the 
establishment of the PRC, China emphasized a "people's war" 
strategy where every individual was expected to fight in 
defense of the nation. Educational requirements for soldiers 
fighting this type of war were minimal. As China developed 
and its strategy changed to one based on the use of advanced 
technologies, the need for an educated and better trained 
soldier arose. In accordance with the new doctrine, 
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education requirements for conscripts and volunteers began to 
increase in the early 1980s. At the same time a renewed 
emphasis was placed on military education and training. 
Today, the PLA recruits most of its officer corps from 
among graduates of colleges and technical academies. Enlisted 
recruits are also being held to a higher standard than in the 
past. Men and women enlisting in urban areas are required to 
complete middle school (high school) and rural recruits must 
have at least a junior high education. Those enlistees 
selected for promotion to the officer ranks are required to 
attend "command" schools, from which they receive a degree, 
prior to commissioning. The PLA also worked to develop a 
noncommissioned officer corps (NCO) for those not selected 
for office training. (Godwin 1994) In addition to more 
stringent recruiting practices, the PLA is also revising its 
military training system. 
In the fall of 1993 CMC Vice Chairman Liu Huaqing wrote 
an article emphasizing the importance of education and 
training in the modernization process. In the article, Liu 
stated that the PLA should "put education and training in a 
strategic position." (Huaqing 1993) During a session of the 
CMC in early 1994, the Chinese followed Liu's recommendation. 
The "conference gave crucial strategic place to intensified 
education and training to improve the army's mobile-response 
capability to cope with sudden incidents on modern terms .... " 
(JPRS 1994) The PLA began to place greater emphasis on the 
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quality of its military academies and on professional 
military education. 
The Chinese established the National Defense University 
in 1985. The University is a merger of the PLA Military 
Academy and the PLA Logistic Academy and is operated by the 
Central Military Commission. (Yoon 1988) The importance of 
military academy training is considered imperative in the PLA 
today. Those who do not have academy training cannot be 
promoted to the position of "cadres," a level of Communist 
Party membership required for advancement into higher ranks 
of the military and government. (Huaqing 1993) 
An emphasis is also being placed on Professional 
Military Education (PME) and combined arms training. This 
revision was prompted by an acknowledged lack of experience 
in planning and troop employment in combined operations. 
Soldiers are now required to receive PME in designated 
schools prior to promotion. (Godwin 1994) In addition to PME 
and combined training, all chief officers are to receive 
higher education by the year 2000. (Yoon 1988) 
B. FORCE STRUCTURE 
In 1977 the Chinese military was organized in eleven 
military regions and divided into Main and Local Forces. 
Main Force divisions were commanded by the Ministry of 
National Defense and stood ready for operations in any 
region. Local Forces, on the other hand, concentrated on 
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defense of their own localities and included Border Defense 
and Internal Defense units. Infantry divisions dominated 
both Main and Local Forces. China's Main Force included 121 
(out of 136) infantry divisions with only twelve armored 
divisions. Local Forces, which were almost entirely composed 
of infantry, totaled 70 divisions. The complete force 
numbered almost 4 million soldiers, sailors and airmen with 
the vast majority (3,250,000) in the army component. (IISS 
1977) The large, predominantly infantry, force was essential 
to China's strategy of "People's War." Primarily a defensive 
force, the PLA was not capable of conducting protracted 
large-scale operations at any significant distance outside 
mainland China. 
By 1981 PLA forces reached a numeric high with 4,750,000 
soldiers, sailors and airmen. The army component remained 
the largest branch of the PLA with almost 4 million men while 
the navy and air components grew to 360,000 and 490,000 
respectively. This represented an increase of 60,000 sailors 
and 90,000 airmen from the previous period. (IISS 1981) The 
number of soldiers, however, was reduced drastically the 
following year to 3,150,000. A reorganization program 
implemented by the PLA in 1982 probably accounts for this 
drastic reduction in force size. (IISS 1986) The navy and 
air elements of the PLA remained at their 1981 peak, possibly 
as a result of China's new emphasis on naval and air forces. 
(IISS 1982) 
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Several other changes were made over the next few years 
as well. China's 1985 change in strategy prompted a series of 
modifications in force structure. The Regional Army was 
reorganized into seven Military Regions and Field Armies were 
redesignated as 'Group Armies.' Group Armies unified 
infantry, armor, artillery, air defense and support assets 
under one commander. (Henley 1988) The Military Regions were 
intended primarily to serve an administrative function in 
peacetime and as Fronts or Strategic Sectors in wartime. 
Command of Main Force divisions would shift from the General 
Staff at the Ministry of National Defense during peacetime to 
Front or Strategic Sector Commander's during war. (IISS 1986) 
This shift seems to represent a decentralization of command 
authority for wartime operations. 
To support the new strategy of limited, high-tech 
warfare, the PLA developed "fist" units. Fist forces are 
roughly equivalent to special forces in the United States. 
These units are small, well-trained combat forces trained to 
fulfill four major functions. 
As "door openers" striking at critical targets and 
widening a breach in the enemy's position; as a 
"scalpel" to strike at targets that when destroyed will 
paralyze an enemy's combat potential; as "steel hammers" 
to seize crucial enemy positions; and as "boosters" to 
speed up the tempo of an operation by opening up new 
battle areas within the invaded area. (Godwin 1994) 
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Each of the seven military regions has its own "fist" units 
trained for contingencies specific to its local situation and 
potential adversaries. (Godwin 1994) 
The new concept shifted the PLA's emphasis to fighting 
with advanced technology weapons. It soon became apparent 
that the military could not afford to both build a high-tech 
force and continue to support its four million troops. As a 
result, in 1985 the decision was made to reduce the number of 
soldiers from four million to three million in two years. 
(Yoon 1988) The cut was not completed, however, until 1989. 
In that year the Milita~ Balance reported the PLA at 
2,300,000 soldiers, 260,0000 sailors and 470,000 airmen. At 
the same time the ratio of infantry divisions to armored 
divisions drastically changed. By 1995 China's Main Force 
had dropped to 82 infantry divisions (including nine rapid 
response divisions) while the number of armored divisions 
remained approximately the same at eleven divisions. (IISS 
1995) Furthermore, reports indicate that the PLA will be cut 
by another 500,000 in the next few year resulting in a total 
end strength of around 2.5 million. (Asiaweek 1996) It seems 
probable that future reductions will also concentrate on 
infantry divisions. While the infantry will always play a 
major role in the PLA's force structure, it is becoming less 
important in the era of high-tech warfare. 
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C. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
China is currently lagging behind the United States in 
military technology. Their primary weakness is in Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), electronic 
warfare, precision guided munitions and jet engine design. 
(Yoon 1988) While China is developing rapidly, it is still 
plagued by "low levels of industrial modernization and 
limited technological sophistication." (Yoon 1988) Without 
advances in these areas China will not be able to build a 
modern force without significant assistance from more 
advanced nations. 
The need for a modern force based on high-tech systems 
was made painfully clear to the PLA during the Gulf War. The 
rapid defeat of Iraq by the United States sent shock waves 
throughout China's military leadership and highlighted the 
need for a modern military. Most of China's current force, 
like Iraq's, is based on designs and technology from the 
1950s and 1960s. Modernization depends on the efforts of a 
small number of highly qualified scientists and technicians 
to bring China's base capabilities up to par. A shortage of 
qualified scientists and engineers, however, has forced 
Beijing to concentrate the majority of its best people in 
select high-priority projects. (Yoon 1988) Fiscally 
constrained, the PLA has been focusing on high priority 
breakthrough points rather than concentrating on an all-round 
buildup. The high-tech drive by the military is viewed by 
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many as a driving force behind the development of science and 
technology for the whole nation. (Ji 1995) 
C3I, space-based systems and the development of 
precision guided missile technology, high speed computers, 
artificial intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) systems 
are at the core of China's R&D efforts. The military is 
taking a middle of the road approach to its development 
strategy which lies between steadily upgrading of older 
equipment and leaping to the next generation of systems for 
select units such as the elite "fist" units. (Ji 1995) A 
major objective of defense modernization is to build an R&D 
base that will allow China to develop and manufacture 
advanced technology weapon systems that can compete with 
those in the west. China's R&D program includes technology 
for both power projection and for defense. 
D. ACQUISITIONS 
In addition to the improvements discussed above, the PLA 
must also update its weapon systems and equipment. Three 
possibilities exist for obtaining advanced weapon systems. 
The Chinese have the option of purchasing advanced weapons on 
the foreign market, reverse-engineering existing technologies 
or indigenously developing new weapon systems. The quickest 
way for China to achieve a modern military is by purchasing 
advanced weapon systems on the foreign market. The PLA, 
however, does not have the fiscal means to modernize in this 
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manner. China is well aware that the Soviet Union's collapse 
was partially the result of military expenditures taking 
priority over economic modernization. For this reason, the 
"Four Modernizations" place military modernization behind 
economic modernizations, inhibiting the PLA's ability to 
purchase the latest systems from abroad. Even if China had 
the money to purchase weapons on the open market, it is 
historically predispositioned toward self-reliance. Self-
reliance became even more important following the Sino-Soviet 
split in 1960. Throughout the 1950s the Soviets assisted the 
Chinese in developing a nuclear program. This assistance 
came to a sudden halt when ideological differences developed 
between the two states. China is therefore very wary of 
having to depend on foreign powers for its defense and 
military equipment. 
In view of China's fiscal constraints and predisposition 
toward self-reliance, indigenous production would seem to be 
the most likely method of military modernization. This, 
however, is impossible. China lacks the industrial base and 
scientific knowledge to build technologically advanced 
weapons. 
As a result, China has chosen to modernize it military 
by employing all three methods. It is buying a limited 
number of advanced weapons from Russia in a stop-gap effort. 
It is also attempting to reverse engineer some high-tech 
systems and indigenously develop others. 
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In this section I will analyze weapons systems purchased 
for the army, navy, air force and the strategic component of 
the PLA since 1977 with an emphasis on purchases since 1989. 
In order to determine the speed and extent at which the PLA 
is modernizing I have conducted a longitudinal study of 
China's order of battle, as reported in the Milita~ Balance, 
from 1977 to the present. The most recent information on 
military acquisitions is drawn from a number of other sources 
as well. 
1. People's Liberation Army-Ground Forces 
From 1977 to 1989 the army element of the PLA relied 
heavily on infantry soldiers for China's defense. The few 
armored divisions (varying between 10 and 13 divisions) were 
equipped with 1950s and 1960s technology. These divisions 
operated Soviet-built IS-2 hy, T-34 and Chinese Type 59/-63 
medium tanks, Type 60 (PT-76) amphibious tanks and Type-62 
light tanks. (IISS 1977) Throughout the 1980s the army 
concentrated on purchasing trucks and transports vice 
modernizing its more advanced equipment. Emphasis seems to 
have been placed on increased mobility, structural changes 
and professionalization. 
The army began updating its tank force in the late 
1980s. Type-79 and Type-80 tanks were added to its inventory 
in 1989 and Type-85s were added in 1992. (IISS 1989, IISS 
1992) China has also "reportedly purchased a limited number 
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of T-72s from Russia and is negotiating to obtain other 
advanced technologies and coproduction rights for advanced 
munitions and weapons." (GAO 1995) In addition, China and 
Pakistan signed an agreement in 1990 to cooperate in the 
development of a "state of the art" Main Battle Tank (MBT) . 
It is believed that Pakistan will mainly serve as a 
technology conduit to Beijing. China is also suspected of 
submitting designs for a new MBT to Vickers, a British firm 
with experience in designing tanks. (Bain 1994) The 
incorporation of foreign technologies into a new generation 
of Chinese tanks has the potential to improve significantly 
the PLA's existing armored force. 
In addition to improvements in heavy armor, the PLA has 
introduced two new armored personnel carriers (APC) and 
invested in the development of new anti-tank guided missiles 
(ATGM). (Bain 1994) They are also producing M-9 (CSS-6/DF-
15) and M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) solid-fueled, mobile surface-to-
surface missiles (SSM) with ranges of 350 miles and 180 
miles, respectively. (Bitzinger and Gill 1996) A follow on 
to the M-9 and M-11 may be in the developmental stage. 
(Lennox 1996) 
2 • People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 
The navy and air components of the PLA composed only 
about one-seventh the size of the total force in 1977. The 
navy, at 300,000 sailors, operated 22 major surface 
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combatants including 6 Luda-class destroyers, 4 Soviet Gordy-
class destroyers and 12 frigates (including 4 Soviet Riga-
class). The destroyers and the four Riga-escorts were armed 
with Styx SSMs. The navy also employed an impressive 
submarine force with 66 attack submarines (36 Soviet Romeos, 
21 Soviet Whiskeys and 2 Chinese Ming-class) and one Soviet 
Golf-class submarine with SLBM tubes (probably no missiles) . 
(IISS 1977) While the number of combatant surface ships was 
relatively small for a country with such a large coastline, 
the submarine force was formidable. However, it did lack the 
nuclear-power and ballistic-missile capability of the Soviet 
Union and United States. 
The Chinese navy also operated a number of non-
combatants including patrol escorts, submarine chasers, 
missile craft, minesweepers and amphibious landing ships. A 
number of smaller (under 100 tons) vessels were maintained 
for coast and riverine defense. (IISS 1977) The navy 
remained a predominantly defensive force lacking the 
facilities and logistic support for power-projection and 
sustainment of forces outside the waters immediately adjacent 
to the Chinese mainland. 
Throughout the 1980s the navy's modernization was slow 
and incremental. As the Chinese began to realize the 
importance of sea power it increased the size of the navy by 
20 percent to 360,000 sailors. While the number of combatant 
surface ships was slowly increased, more emphasis was placed 
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on the submarine force. In 1978 the first Han-class nuclear 
-powered submarine was added to China's order of battle. The 
attack submarine force was rapidly expanding, more than 
doubling in the next decade. 
By 1986 the Chinese were operating 46 major surface 
combat ships. The navy had slowly increased the number of 
Luda-class destroyers from six to eleven ships each carrying 
2 triple HY-2 SSM. The number of frigates was expanding more 
rapidly. The number rose from twelve to thirty-one in eight 
years. The majority of these were Type-037 Jianghu and Type-
053H mod Jianghu equipped with HY-2 SSMs. 
The submarine force expanded rapidly in the early 1980s 
increasing to 118 boats by 1986. (IISS 1986) In that year, 
the navy was operating three Han-class nuclear-powered 
submarines equipped with 6 SY-2 cruise missiles with a 
reported range of 1,600 km. (IISS 1984) It was also 
operating 113 conventionally powered attack boats the 
majority of which were Soviet Romeo-class. The number of 
Romeo attack submarines had increased from 36 in 1977 to 90 
in 1986, a significant escalation. Perhaps the most 
significant addition to China's fleet, however, was the 
addition of the first nuclear-powered ballistic submarine, 
the Xia-class, in 1985 (launched in 1981). The Xia was 
loaded with 12 CSS-NX-4 submarine launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM) with a range of 2,200 to 3,000 km. (IISS 1985) The 
incorporation of these boats into the navy's order of battle 
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gave China a sea leg for its strategic forces. The addition 
of a subsurface, mobile component greatly increased the 
viability of the force. 
The number and quality of patrol boats, missile craft 
and amphibious ships were also slowly increased in the early 
1980s. In the mid-1980s the Chinese navy initiated a program 
of new ship construction. Admiral Liu Huaqing envisioned a 
program based on indigenous designs that incorporated Western 
technologies. (Caldwell 1994) Several new classes of ships 
were developed and built as a result. Luhu and Luda III-class 
destroyers, Jiangwei-class frigates, Dayun-class resupply 
vessels and Houjian and Houxin-class missile patrol craft 
were all placed in service in the early 1990s. (Caldwell 
1994) 
The addition of the Luhu and upgraded Luda (Luda III) 
class destroyers along with the Jiangwei-class frigate 
represent a significant improvement to the navy's surface 
combat fleet. The Luhu was launched in 1991 and placed in 
service in 1993. (Caldwell 1994, Bain 1994) Its uGeneral 
Electric gas turbine engines vastly improve range and speed . 
(while) enhanced missiles and French gunnery and 
helicopters increase the firepower of the class." (Bain 1994) 
Its missile systems include C-801 surface-to-surface missile 
(SSM) launchers and a Crotale surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
system. The Luhu also operates two Z-9A (French Dauphin) 
58 
helicopters. (IISS 1995) Currently only one Luhu is 
operational but three more are planned. (Caldwell 1994) 
The improved Luda-class ships (Luda III) also carry the 
solid-fuelled C-801 SSM launchers. These are less dangerous 
and cumbersome than the liquid-fuelled ones installed on 
previous models. The Luda III is also better suited for 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) than previous ships in its class. 
For power-projection, the vessel is able to operate at a 
range of 4,790 km without refuelling. While the Luda III is 
an improvement over previous Luda class destroyers, it lacks 
a surface-to-air missile system and probably has limited 
command and control capabilities. (Caldwell 1994) It may, 
however, eventually carry the CY-1 anti-submarine missile. 
The CY-1 is still in the developmental stage but has been 
seen fitted to Luda III destroyers. The missile has a range 
of 18 km and carries a torpedo warhead. (Lennox 1996) As of 
mid-1995 only two Luda IIIs had been built. (Swaine 1996) 
The remainder of the Luda-class ships are still of the 
obsolete Luda I and II versions. 
The fourth Jiangwei-class frigate was commissioned in 
1995. This class also carries C-801 SSM launchers and 
operates one Z-9A helicopter. (IISS 1995) Over eighty 
percent of China's frigates, however, are the older Jianghu-
class operating with upgraded equipment. 
China's purchase of the French SAM system increases the 
PLAN's ability to provide air defense for its surface ships. 
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At the same time, the addition of Dauphin helicopters and the 
FQF-2500 ASW rocket system increased the PLAN's ASW 
capability. (Yung 1996) Despite these improvements, PLAN 
combatants are still antiquated by western standards. The 
majority of surface combatants have not been upgraded with 
the new AAW weapons and thus remain vulnerable to air attack. 
China's submarine fleet is also continuing to improve. 
The PLAN's current submarine fleet consists of one SSBN 
(Xia), five nuclear-powered attack submarines (Han), one 
guided missile boat (mod-Romeo) and 45 conventional attack 
submarines. Many of the old Romeo-class boats have been 
placed in a non-operational status leaving 33 active. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese have continued to increase the number 
of improved Ming submarines and have purchased four Kilos 
from the Russians. (IISS 1995) Only two Kilos have been 
delivered to date, however. (Swaine 1996) The PLAN has also 
developed a new type of submarine to replace the Romeo and 
Ming class boats. The Song-class is built indigenously but 
incorporates advanced western technologies. Its skewed 
seven-bladed propeller and hydrodynamic hull give the Song a 
degree of stealth not found in other Chinese submarines. 
(Yung 1996) Its effectiveness against the advanced ASW 
capability of western nations, however, is still to be 
determined. The first hull of this class was launched in 
1994. (Swaine 1996) 
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While China's recent submarine acquisitions appear 
impressive, Christopher Yung of the Center for Naval Analysis 
(CNA) argues that a number of factors reduce the 
effectiveness of China's submarine force. First, most 
Chinese submarines still operate with sonar derived from 
Soviet designs of the 1950s. Second, the operational 
readiness of the submarine fleet is questionable, at best. 
The lack of properly trained sailors restricts the PLAN from 
operating most of its submarines for more than a few days a 
year. Finally, with the possible exception of the new Song-
class boat, Chinese submarines are noisier than western 
submarines and the absence of air-independent propulsion 
requires frequent snorkeling. (Yung 1996) While the Chinese 
submarine fleet may be effective against other Asian navies, 
its ability to survive the ASW sensors and weapons of more 
advanced navies is probably very limited. 
Other additions to China's order of battle in recent 
years have been Houxin-class missile craft and Yukan and 
Yuting-class landing ship, tank (LST). (IISS 1995) The 
missile craft, although an asset to defense and coastal 
patrol forces, do not increase the PLAN's ability to project 
power. The addition of the new LST classes have a greater 
troop carrying capacity than the older classes of amphibious 
ships, but China's ability to transport and sustain troops 
away from the Chinese mainland is still very restricted. 
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It is also important to note that China has a naval air 
force and a naval infantry (~arines) . Although there has 
been sporadic discussions about acquiring an aircraft 
carrier, the Chinese have yet to do so. This hesitation is 
most likely based on the cost of such a purchase. In October 
1996 the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that "France is 
seriously considering a Chinese request to buy the 35-year-
old carrier Clemenceau .... " (Chanda 1996) A former French 
government official was quoted as saying ". we are ready 
to sell the Clemenceau for nothing provided we do the 
refitting of the vessel." (Chanda 1996) Without an aircraft 
carrier the majority of PLAN aircraft are shore-based. The 
latest Milita~ Balance reports the Naval Air Force at 25,000 
airmen operating 855 shore-based combat aircraft and 68 armed 
helicopters. The bomber force includes some 25 H-6 and H-6D 
aircraft and about 130 H-5 torpedo carrying light bombers. 
The navy also has about 100 Q-5 ground attack aircraft and 
some 600 fighter (J-5/-6/-7/-8}. It is also developing a 
twin-engine fighter-bomber, the FB-7. The FB-7s primary 
mission is interdiction and it is expected to carry two C-801 
ship attack cruise missiles and two drop tanks. (Allen, 
Krumel and Pollack 1995) For ASW the PLAN maintains 15 Soviet 
Be-6 Madge and a number of ASW helicopters. (IISS 1995) 
These aircraft will be discussed in more detail in the PLAAF 
section. 
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The Marine component of the PLAN includes approximately 
5,000 troops operating T-59 main battle tanks and T-60/-63 
and PT-76 light tanks. 
3. People's Liberation Army Air Force {PLAAF) 
The air force component of the PLA, like the navy, began 
slowly modernizing its forces in the late 1970s. In 1977 the 
air force numbered 400,000 airmen and approximately 5,200 
combat aircraft. The bomber force included 80 Soviet 
designed Tu-16 and a few Tu-4 medium bombers and around 400 
Il-28 and 100 Tu-2 light bombers. The fighter force 
consisted of 600 MiG-15 and Chinese designed F-9s along with 
approximately 4,000 Mig-17/-19 and 120 MiG-21s. In addition, 
the air force operated around 450 fixed wing aircraft and 350 
helicopters. 
Twenty years later, the PLAAF continues to rely on 
obsolete versions of Soviet designed aircraft. However, the 
Chinese have made a few improvements to its air force and 
future plans are ambitious. Most of the air order of battle 
is still composed of Chinese versions of MiG-17, MiG-19 and 
MiG-21 fighters as well as the old Tu-16 bomber. These 
aircraft are designated J-5, J-6, J-7 and H-6, respectively. 
(Swaine 1996) While the Chinese produced more than 1060 J-5s 
(MiG-17) only 400 remain in the PLAAF's inventory today. 
(Frawley and Thorn 1995, IISS 1995) The Russian MiG-17 was 
designed to overcome design and performance shortcomings of 
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the MiG-15. The first prototype flew in February 1950 with 
the first Chinese-produced aircraft reported operational in 
the fall of 1956. (Frawley and Thorn 1995, Allen, Krumel and 
Pollack 1995) The J-5 served as China's primary interceptor 
until the late 1960s when it was replaced by the J-6. (Allen, 
Krumel and Pollack 1995) 
The Chinese obtained a license to produce the basic MiG-
19 (J-6) in the late 1950s. The first Chinese assembled 
aircraft, built by the Shenyang Aircraft Factory, first flew 
in December 1958 while the first Chinese built MiG-19 flew in 
September 1959. (Frawley and Thorn 1995) Most of the 
aircraft built before production ceased in the early 1980s 
are still in the Chinese inventory including all-weather and 
reconnaissance variants. (Allen, Krumel and Pollack 1995) 
Three-quarters of the current Chinese fighter force, 
approximately 3,000 aircraft, is composed of J-6s. 
The base J-7 (MiG-21) is also based on 1950s Soviet 
technology. The first Soviet/Chinese aircraft were limited 
to day operations of short range and endurance. As a result, 
the Chinese almost abandoned the program in the late 1970s. 
A decision to retain the program, however, was made based on 
lessons learned from the border war with Vietnam and stolen 
plans for the Soviets later-model day and all-weather MiG-
21s. An improved model, the F-7-2, included a more powerful 
engine and external fuel tank capability. In the early 1980s 
further improvements were made based on the all-weather 
64 
capability of the MiG-21pf. This variant is designated the 
F-7-3. (Allen, Krumel and Pollack 1995) China will probably 
continue serial production of the J-7 and the more advanced 
J-8 fighter. (Bitzinger and Gill 1996) 
The PLAAF operates about 100 J-8/J-8 II fighters and 
more than 400 low-performance Q-5 ground attack aircraft. 
(IISS 1995) The J-8 interceptors are based on 1960s 
technology and are similar to the MiG-21 in overall 
configuration. The improved version of the aircraft, the J-8 
II, has a secondary ground attack role. The J-8 II was 
scheduled to be fit with U.S. avionics and other 
improvements, but the program was suspended after the 1989 
Tiananmen Square massacre. (Frawley and Thorn 1995) The J-8 
II is reportedly scheduled to be upgraded with Russian fire 
control radars in the near future. (Cook 1996) 
The Q-5 is a close air support/ground attack fighter 
developed from China's MiG-19 copy. The longer range Q-5 I 
has extra fuel in place of the internal bomb bay and the Q-5 
II is fitted with a radar warning receiver. (Frawley and 
Thorn 1995) 
China's attempt to modernize the PLAAF fighter force was 
extremely weak throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It primarily 
relied on upgrading existing aircraft models with more 
advanced technology, although it was rarely the latest 
technology available. A more serious attempt to update 
China's fighter force began in the early 1990s with the 
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purchase of 26 Russian Su-27 Flankers. The Flanker is an 
extremely maneuverable fighter with a long range capability, 
a large missile armament and modern radar and sensors. 
(Frawley and Thorn 1996) China is also reportedly seeking to 
purchase an additional 46 Su-27s enough to give the PLAAF 72 
Flankers, three regiments worth. (Bain 1994) Recent reports 
indicate that Moscow has even agreed to sell the license to 
produce the aircraft to the Chinese. (Campion 1996, Ching 
1996) 
In addition to the Su-27 purchase, China is also funding 
two major combat aircraft development programs, the FC-1 and 
the J-10. The FC-1 is based on a Soviet program to "develop 
an F-16 like, single-engine version of the MiG-29, known at 
the time (the mid-1980s) as the MiG-33." (Cook 1996) While 
the Soviets ultimately rejected the MiG-33 design, the 
Chinese are using it as a building block for the FC-1. 
Unlike previous Chinese built aircraft, the FC-1 incorporates 
the most advanced technology available on the world market. 
Much of the avionics is being solicited from Europe and 
Israel. The aircraft's maiden flight is expected next year 
and it is expected to enter service at the turn of the 
century. The FC-1 will most likely serve as a replacement 
for aging Q-5, J-6 and J-7s. (Cook 1996) 
The PLAAF is also developing a next-generation combat 
aircraft, the J-10. The J-10 is a cross between the U.S. F-
16 and the Israeli-built Lavi. The aircraft will have a 
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head-up display, radar for beyond-visual-range combat and 
radar provisions for radar-guided, air-to-air missiles. A 
prototype is expected to fly within the next year or two with 
initial operations in ten years. (Fulghum 1995) The J-10 
will most likely complement the Su-27s and F-8 II 
interceptors. 
Like China's fighter force, the PLAAF bomber force is 
also outdated. The latest Milita~ Balance reports that 
China has 120 H-6 (Tu-16/B-6), some of which may be nuclear 
capable) and over 300 H-5 (IL-28/B-5) bombers. Both of these 
aircraft are built on Soviet 1950s technology. Some of the 
H-6s carry C-601 cruise missiles and some of the H-5 carry C-
801 ASM. (IISS 1995) An air-launched cruise missile program 
is reportedly in the early stages of development. The 
missile, when developed, will be carried by the H-6. (Lennox 
1996) 
One final addition to the PLAAF is worth mentioning, the 
purchase of fifteen Ilyushin 76M (IL-76) transport aircraft 
from Uzbekistan. (IISS 1995) These aircraft increase China's 
mobility and lift capabilities which will enable rapid 
deployment of forces. Analysts speculate that the IL-76M may 
also be used as electronic warfare or aerial refuelling 
platforms. (Caldwell 1994) 
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4. Strategic Weapon Systems 
a. Offensive 
The missile arm of the PLA is controlled by the 
Second Artillery. In 1977 both the offensive and defensive 
weapons of the Second Artillery were very limited. The 
offensive component was composed of 30-40 CSS-2 Intermediate 
Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) and 30-40 CSS-1 Medium Range 
Ballistic Missiles (MRBM) . The MRBMs had a range of 
approximately 1,800 km and a yield of 15 KT while the IRBMs 
were capable of a 2,500 km range and 1-3 MT. In 1976 China's 
first multi-stage Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
had been tested but was not yet in service. The missile had 
a limited range of 6,000-7,000 km but a longer range missile 
was being reportedly developed. (IISS 1977) 
In addition to these missiles, the Chinese could 
also use its Tu-16 medium bombers as delivery platforms. 
Each bomber had a radius of action of approximately 3,000 km. 
Although the Chinese had a Golf-class submarine with missile 
launch tubes, it didn't have missiles for the boat. (IISS 
1977) 
In 1979 the first ICBM was introduced into service. 
Two of the limited range CSS-3s (1-3 MT) were deployed while 
the longer range version was still in the development phase. 
At the same time, the number of CSS-1s and CSS-2s had 
increased by ten and twenty missiles, respectively. (IISS 
1979) Two more CSS-3s were deployed the following year along 
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with 10-15 additional CSS-2s. (IISS 1980) The long range 
(13,000 km) ICBMs were finally deployed in 1982 along with a 
variant of the IRBM. In addition to having a longer range, 
the new ICBM was more powerful (5 MT) than the previous 
model. (IISS 1982) 
The development and deployment of long range ICBMs 
was considered crucial to the development of China's 
strategic force. Perhaps a more significant development, 
however, was the deployment of the first Chinese nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), the Xia. The 
Xia, equipped with 12 CSS-NX-4 missiles, was first reported 
to be conducting trials in 1982/1983 and was probably 
deployed in 1985. (IISS 1982, IISS 1985) To date, this is 
the only SSBN in operation. The introduction of the 
submarine into China's order of battle added a third leg to 
its strategic force, a leg that was less vulnerable than 
either aircraft or land sites. 
China continued to upgrade its strategic force, 
concentrating on the land leg, throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s. Solid propellants were first reportedly used to fuel 
an ICBM test vehicle in 1980 and in 1985 a CSS-4 was tested 
with a multiple warhead. (IISS 1987) According to the 
Milita~ Balance 1995/96, China currently has its missile 
force divided between six army bases and the Xia submarine. 
Its inventory includes approximately 7 CSS-4 (DF-5) and 10+ 
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CSS-3 (DF-4) ICBMs, 60+ CSS-2 (DF-3) and about 10 CSS-5 (DF-
21) IRBMs and 12 CSS-N-3 (J-1) on the Xia. (IISS 1995) 
The Chinese are currently working on several 
strategic missile projects. A mobile ground-launched IRBM, 
the DF-25, is believed to be in development with an expected 
in service date of 2000. The missile is reported to have a 
range of 1700 km and a 2,000 kg warhead. The Chinese are 
also reportedly developing the DF-31 mobile intercontinental-
range ballistic missile. This missile has been in 
development since the 1970s with a major design change in 
1985. The DF-31 has a 8,000 km range and a single nuclear 
warhead with an expected yield of 250 KT. It is expected to 
be in service in the very near term. Finally, the Chinese 
are developing a ICBM with an expected range of 12,000 km. 
It will have either a single nuclear warhead or three MIRVs 
with yields of 250 KT and 50-90 KT (per warhead), 
respectively. The DF-41 will probably enter service sometime 
between 1998 and 2000. (Lennox 1996) 
b. Defensive 
China's air defense system, in 1977, relied on 
about 4,000 air force and naval fighters, 100 CSA-1 (SA-2) 
and 10,000 anti-air (AA) guns. The system was only ~capable 
of providing a limited defense of key urban and industrial 
areas, military installations and weapon complexes." (IISS 
1977) By the early 1980s China had tracking stations in 
70 
Xinjiang (to cover central Asia) and Shanxi (northern border) 
and a limited shipborne capability. It also had a ballistic 
missile early warning phased-array radar complex. (IISS 1983) 
The air force also began operating an Over-the-Horizon-
Backscatter (OTH-B) radar system. The system had a range of 
700-3,500 km and a 60 degree arc of cover. (IISS 1987) 
China's current inventory of defensive weapons 
includes HQ-2, CSA-N-2 (HQ-61), FM-80 (HQ-7), KS-1 and SA-10 
(S-300). (Lennox 1996) The KS-1 and S-300 are the two most 
recent addition to China's defense force. The KS-1 is a 
medium-range SAM first revealed in 1991. It has a range of 
42 km, operating ceiling of 25 km and speed of Mach 4. The 
KS-1 will probably be the major medium-range SAM system in 
the future. (Jane's Defense Weekly 1995) 
According to a study published by the RAND 
corporation, "The SA-10 is a state-of-the-art air defense 
system available in transportable and self-propelled versions 
with three different missiles." (Allen, Krumel and Pollack) 
The SA-10, which is comparable to the U.S.-built Patriot 
system, has a range of 100 km against aircraft and a limited 
ability to intercept ballistic or cruise missiles. (Caldwell 
1994) The addition of the SA-10 represents a marked 
improvement in China's ability to defend itself. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Since Deng Xioaping announced the implementation of the 
"four modernizations" in 1978, China has slowly been 
modernizing its military. Initially, the modernization 
consisted mainly of upgrades to existing equipment. China's 
change in strategy in 1985 resulted in a massive reduction in 
force size and restructuring of the military but did not 
significantly improve the quality of the PLA's weapon 
systems. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
changes in China's strategic position and shock over the Gulf 
War reinvigorated the modernization process. Significant 
improvements in China's weapon systems began during this 
period. 
It is important to note that the Chinese seem to be 
concentrating on modernization of the PLAN. The 
commissioning of a new class of frigate, a new class of 
destroyer and new classes of landing ships, purchase of four 
Kilo class submarines and negotiation for a French aircraft 
carrier indicate that the Chinese are attempting to increase 
their power projection capability. In addition, the purchase 
of Su-27 aircraft for the PLAAF also increases the reach of 
China's military. 
The move toward a blue water navy is probably aimed at 
protecting China's claimed territory in the South China Sea. 
Currently, the Chinese are not capable of sustaining a 
forward deployed force for more than a short period of time. 
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Thus, while China may be capable of seizing reefs in the 
South China Sea, it is probably not capable of defending 
them. I also suspect that China would not be capable of 
invading Taiwan if an invasion were deemed necessary. The 
PLAN does not appear to have adequate sealift for such an 
effort. The lack of a blue water navy may not only impede 
China from acting to protect its interests, it also may be a 
source of humiliation, especially in a time where other Asian 
nations are expanding and improving their navies. 
While China has placed an increased emphasis on military 
modernization in the last few years, its military capability 
remains an estimated 15-20 years behind the United States. 
In spite of its efforts to develop a blue water navy, the PLA 
is still primarily a brown water navy. 
The Chinese are also attempting to increase their air 
capability. The purchase of Su-27s by the PLAAF as well as 
development of the J-10 will give the air force a more modern 
capability. Despite these advances, the PLAAF is still 
mainly operating aircraft of 1950s and 1960s design. The 
majority of its fighter aircraft are J-6s (MiG-19) which the 
Chinese have been producing since the late 1950s. Its bomber 
force, which is also based on 1950s technology, is similarly 
outdated. 
In addition to shortfalls in the air and naval forces, 
China lacks credible C3I, electronic warfare and precision 
guided capabilities. Each of these capabilities is necessary 
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to create a modern military force. In spite of current 
deficiencies, it is possible that with continued economic 
growth China will be able to make great strides in improving 
its military capability. Purchasing advanced technologies 
and weapon systems from foreign sources, China could rapidly 
advance all of its forces. 
This examination of China's military modernization 
highlights the PLA's capabilities and may give some insight 
into its intentions. Analysis of PLA deployment patterns 
over the last two decades and recent military exercise 
activity should enable a more indepth understanding of 
China's intentions. 
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V. FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AND MILITARY EXERCISES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
PLA forces were divided among eleven military regions 
(MR) until the mid-1980s when they were consolidated into 
seven regions. Naval forces, on the other hand, have always 
been divided between three fleets, the North, East and South 
Sea Fleets. In this chapter I will analyze Chinese force 
deployments to these military regions (MR) and naval fleets 
over a 20 year time span. I will also examine PLA field 
exercise training conducted in 1995 and compare the location, 
type and number of those exercises with similar exercises 
conducted the previous year. Military regions with large 
troop concentrations indicate that the Chinese are concerned 
about security in these areas. Regions with fewer PLA 
divisions seem to suggest that the Chinese do not have the 
same level of concern about these areas. The same logic 
applies to the number and type of military exercises. A 
concentration of forces combined with increasing exercise 
activity in a particular MR may indicate that the Chinese 
have intentions of using these forces. By observing changes 
in deployment patterns it may be possible to determine areas 
at risk of PLA aggression. 
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B. FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND FIELD EXERCISE ACTIVITY 
The information on force deployments in this section was 
collected from editions of the Milita~ Balance covering the 
years 1980 through 1996. It is important to note that the 
Local Forces (LF) included in the PLA inventory between 1980 
and 1985 were no longer considered PLA forces after the 
military reorganization that began in 1985. While these 
forces still exist, they will not be included in force 
deployment data subsequent to 1985. 
This chapter examines PLA deployments based on the 
current seven MRs. Those MRs that were absorbed by other 
regions in 1985 will be included in the data for the 
absorbing region. In most cases the regions combined to form 
the new MR is clear. It is not clear, however, exactly how 
the PLA disposed of forces belonging to Wuhan MR prior to 
1985. Most likely they were divided between Jinan and 
Guangzhou MRs. 
The information on field exercise activity is based on 
open source Chinese media articles published by the Army 
paper and other state controlled media. 
l.. Beijing MR 
Beijing MR is adjacent to the south-eastern portion of 
Mongolia and responsible for defense of China's capital. In 
1980 more forces were concentrated in this MR than in any 
other section of China. A total of 28 infantry, five armored 
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and 12 LF divisions defended Beijing. (IISS 1980) The 
deployment of such a large number of troops along the 
Mongolian border indicated that China was very concerned with 
Soviet intentions in the late 1970s. In view of the tensions 
between the two nations following the Sino-Soviet split it 
seems reasonable that China would make the China-Mongolian 
border and defense of Beijing its main priority. 
While the Beijing MR was significantly reduced as a 
result of manpower cuts in the mid to late 1980s, it still 
harbors the largest number of active PLA divisions. The last 
report analyzed, 1995/96, indicates that a total of two 
armored, 20 infantry and two artillery divisions currently 
are stationed in the Beijing MR. (IISS 1995) 
As for the number of field exercises conducted in the 
Beijing MR, reports indicate that the PLA only conducted one 
Group Army (GA) exercise and five Division-level field 
exercises in 1995. In the GA exercise, which took place 
between mid-June and August, an unidentified GA moved forces 
from the sea, north of Beijing and into inner Mongolia to the 
Gobi desert. (DIA 1996) 
The number of exercises in the Beijing MR was markedly 
reduced from the previous year. In 1994 "the Chinese media 
reported on five GA, eight Division, one Brigade, and two 
Regiment-level field exercises by Beijing MR units." (DIA 
1996) The one major field exercise seems to be aimed at 
defending against a Russian attack through Mongolia. The 
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decrease in activity in the Beijing MR is most likely due to 
a continuing reduction of tension between China and Russia 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
2 • Chengdu MR 
Chengdu MR is located on China's southern border 
adjacent to Nepal, India, Burma, Laos and Vietnam and 
represents a consolidation of the former Chengdu MR and 
Kunming MR. By 1980 Chengdu supported a total of nine 
infantry divisions and five LF divisions, while Kunming had 
six infantry and five LF divisions. (IISS 1980) This 
concentration of forces in Chengdu and Kunming probably was 
in response to border conflicts with India and tensions 
between China and Vietnam prior to and during the 1979 war. 
The number of divisions stationed in south/south-
western China was reduced significantly in 1989. The 
Military Balance reports Chengdu with 10 infantry divisions 
in that year. The number of divisions continued to decrease 
over the next few years with the latest data reporting one 
artillery and seven infantry divisions in Chengdu MR. The 
reduction in troop concentration in this region is most 
likely due to a combination of events. It is, no doubt, 
partially the result of personnel reductions and it is also 
probably the result of decreasing tensions with Vietnam and 
India. An agreement signed by China and India in November 
1996 is evidence of the reducted anxieties between the two 
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states. The agreementcalls for partial demilitarization of 
the border and reaffirms that "neither side shall use force 
against the other by any means or seek unilateral military 
support." (CNN 1996) 
Open sources report that Chengdu MR units Gonducted two 
GA, four Division, one Brigade and two Regiment-level field 
exercises in 1995. Exercises conducted in the region 
included river-crossing and beach-seizing exercises, an air 
corps surprise attack exercise and cold-weather training 
involving an offensive by high-tech combined arms forces. 
The number of GA and Division-level exercises conducted in 
1995 represented a doubling of activity from the previous 
year when units in the region conducted only one GA, two 
Brigade and one Regimental-level exercise. (DIA 1996) The 
reason for this increase in 1995 is unclear. As discussed 
earlier, Chengdu MR borders India and Vietnam. While 
tensions between China and these two nations have been 
reduced in the past few years, China may still consider them 
a threat. Another possibility is that the increased training 
is intended to ready forces to counter ethnic unrest in 
western China. 
3 • Guangzhou MR 
Guangzhou MR is located on China's southern border 
adjacent north-eastern Vietnam and looks south to the South 
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China Sea. In 1980 this MR supported 12 infantry and 11 LF 
division, ranking third of the 11 military regions in number 
of deployed troops. (IISS 1980) The concentration of forces 
in Guangzhou, like in Chengdu, was most likely in response to 
tensions between China and Vietnam prior to and during the 
1979 War. 
The number of divisions stationed in Guangzhou remained 
steady through the mid-1980s, but was increased to 17 
infantry divisions in 1985. (IISS 1985) This was probably 
the result of the MR absorbing part of the former Wuhan MR. 
The number began to decrease in 1989 as military cut-backs 
took effect. Currently Guangzhou has only six infantry 
divisions and three air divisions (Air Force). (IISS 1995) 
Despite the reduction in forces stationed in the 
Guangzhou, the most significant increase in exercise activity 
between 1994 and 1995 took place in this MR. The region 
borders Vietnam but perhaps more indicatively, it faces the 
South China Sea and the disputed Spratly Islands. In 1995 
units in the region conducted two GA exercises, four division 
and two Brigade exercises as compared to only one GA, one 
division and one Brigade-level exercise in 1994. Some of the 
exercises "practiced swimming and beach landing drills and 
rehearsed island-seizing operations." (DIA 1996) 
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4. Jinan MR 
Jinan MR is located just to the south of the Beijing MR 
across the Yellow Sea from North Korea. In 1980 the region 
supported eight infantry, three LF and one armored division. 
The number of divisions only slightly increased in 1985 as 
the MR absorbed part of Wuhan MR. (IISS 1985) A more 
significant increase was reported in 1992 when the number of 
divisions increased to thirteen infantry, two armored, one 
artillery and one air division. (IISS 1992) The reason for 
the increase at that particular time is unclear, although 
Jinan still retains that level of forces. (IISS 1995) 
Meanwhile, field exercise activity in the Jinan MR 
during 1995 remained relatively comparable to the 1994 level. 
While the number of GA exercises decreased from two in 1994 
to one in 1995, the number of Division-level exercises 
increased from seven in 1994 to 11 in 1995. (DIA 1996) 
5. Lanzhou MR 
In 1977 the North-Western portion of China was divided 
into two MRs, Lanzhou and Xinjiang. Together these two 
regions contained 20 MF and 8 LF divisions. (IISS 1977) By 
1980 the Xinjiang MR was replaced by the Urumqi MR. It is 
not clear whether this was due to a change in headquarters 
(HQ) or just a name change. The region, however, was still 
reported as covering western China. The number of divisions 
in Lanzhou was one armored and eight infantry in 1980. At 
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the same time there were six infantry divisions stationed in 
Urumqi. (IISS 1980) 
Urumqi was absorbed by Lanzhou during the force 
reorganization of 1985. At that time, the region contained 
one armored and 13 infantry divisions. (IISS 1985) The 
region is similarly configured today with one tank and 12 
infantry divisions. (IISS 1995) The Lanzhou MR borders 
Mongolia, Russia and India and contains a large number of 
ethnic minorities. The troops in this region probably serve 
a number of purposes including defense against Russia and 
India and containment of civil strife in the local populace. 
In 1995 units in Lanzhou MR conducted two GA, nine 
Division, one Brigade and six Regiment-level exercises. 
While one fewer GA exercise was conducted, this represented a 
slight increase in overall exercise activity from the 
previous year. The 1994 exercises included three GA, nine 
Division, one Brigade and two at the Regiment-level. In 
September 1995 a GA conducted a long distance rapid mobility 
exercise over a 1,500 km distance. Many of the lower-level 
exercises were designed to practice live-fire and rapid 
reaction capabilities. (DIA 1996) The increase in exercise 
activity may be attributable to the instability of newly 
formed Islamic border states and internal ethnic unrest in 
Xinjiang Province. 
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6 • Nanj ing MR 
In the early 1980s most of eastern coast of China was 
divided between the Nanjing and Fuzhou MRs. Combined, 
Nanjing and Fuzhou had a total of 12 infantry, 12 LF and one 
armored division in 1980. (IISS 1980) The two regions 
consolidated into one, the Nanjing MR, in 1985 and increased 
in force size to a peak of 16 infantry divisions in 1985. 
(IISS 1985) Nanjing returned to its pre-1980 size in 1989 
and currently has two tank, 11 infantry and one artillery 
division. (IISS 1989, IISS 1995) 
Nanjing MR is strategically located across the straits 
from Taiwan. In 1995 reports indicated a significant 
increase in the number of field exercises conducted by units 
in the region. Four GA, three Division, one Brigade and two 
Regiment-level exercises were conducted in 1995. In 
contrast, only one GA, one Division, one Brigade and two 
Regiment-level exercises were conducted in 1994. Many of the 
exercises included landing drills and beach seizing 
exercises. In addition, three of the GA exercises were 
amphibious operations including live-fire seaborne tactical 
landings. (DIA 1996) The increased activity may be 
correlated to the growing independence movement in Taiwan. 
Although the number of Taiwanese supporting the movement is 
relatively small, it still serves to antagonize the PRC. 
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7 • Shenyang MR 
Shenyang MR is responsible for North-Eastern China 
including the border with Russia and Mongolia as well as that 
part of China adjacent to North Korea. Next to the Beijing 
MR, Shenyang supported the largest number of division in 1980 
with 18 infantry, three armored and 17 LF divisions. (IISS 
1980) The deployment of such a large number of troops along 
the Soviet/Mongolian border only confirms that China was 
concerned about the Soviet Union. Secondarily, it may have 
been prepared to assist North Korea in the event of conflict 
on the peninsula. 
The Shenyang MR was only slightly reduced as a result of 
the manpower cuts made in the mid to late 1980s. At last 
report the MR still had three tank, 15 infantry and one 
artillery division. (IISS 1995) 
Despite the number of troops stationed in the MR, 
Shenyang experienced a decrease in field exercise activity in 
1995. Two GA, three Division and one Regiment-level exercise 
were conducted in 1995, whereas three GA, seven Division and 
one Regiment-level were conducted in 1994. The only GA 
exercise reported by the Chinese media was a long distance, 
high-tech, rapid mobility exercise across North China into 
Inner Mongolia. (DIA 1995) The reduction in exercise 
activity is, like in the Beijing MR, probably the result of 
improved relations with Russia following the break-up of the 
Soviet Union. 
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C. NAVAL FORCES 
During the time period covered by this study, the navy 
maintained three fleets, the North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet 
and the South Sea Fleet. Interestingly, the number and 
composition of forces deployed to these three fleets remained 
relatively stable over the fifteen year time span. 
In the 1980 Military Balance reported the North Sea 
Fleet, which is responsible for the Yellow Sea, with a total 
of 500 navy vessels. (IISS 1980) In 1989 the publication 
began to produce more specific reports. In that year, the 
North Sea Fleet was reported as having two submarine, three 
escort, one mine warfare and one amphibious squadron. 
Additionally, 325 vessels were reported as patrol and coastal 
defense vessels. (IISS 1989) A slight increase in the number 
of patrol and coastal defense vessels was noted in 1993 
dropping the number to 300. (IISS 1993) No other changes 
were reported in the next two years. 
China's East Sea Fleet contained the largest number of 
navy vessels in 1980 with 750. (IISS 1980) The break-down of 
this force is very similar to the North Sea Fleet. It has 
two submarine, two escort, one mine warfare and one 
amphibious squadron, 270 patrol and coastal defense vessels 
and one Marine division. (IISS 1995) A comparison of the 
data as reported by the Military Balance in the 1987-88 
edition and the 1989-90 edition seems to indicate that, 
although the number of squadrons in the North and East Sea 
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Fleets is comparable, the total number of vessels remains 
much larger in the East Sea Fleet. The East Sea Fleet is 
responsible for the waters just south of the Yellow Sea 
including those adjacent to Taiwan justifying the additional 
forces. 
The South Sea Fleet is structured the same as the East 
Sea Fleet, although it has about fifty more vessels devoted 
to patrol and coastal defense missions. (IISS 1989) The 
total number of vessels reported by the Military Balance 
prior to 1989 was 600, a number in between that of the North 
and East Sea Fleets. (IISS 1987) The South Sea Fleet is 
primarily responsible for waters to the south of China 
including the South China Sea and Spratly Islands. It, 
therefore, seems reasonable that this fleet should have 
control more forces than the North Sea Fleet. 
D. CONCLUSION 
While PLA deployment patterns have not changed 
significantly in the last two decades, the number of troops 
in each MR decreased in accordance with the 1985 reduction in 
force. It is imporatant to note that each of China's 
military regions is in part designed to enforce 'domestic 
stability.' Even where a large number of troops are assigned 
to a MR, some of those troops are dedicated to internal 
security. 
86 
It is also interesting that the Beijing MR receives, and 
has always received, the largest number of troops. These 
troops are not in position to be readily deployed to any 
border where China could reasonably be expected to 'expand' 
or engage in imperial activity. This fact seems to indicate 
that these troops are not maintained for power projection. 
If China's primary intention were to gain regional hegemoony 
through force or threat of force these troops would be 
essential. As it stands, China keeps the largest number of 
its troops in the capital city. This indicates that it is 
concerned about domestic unrest, such as in Tiananmen Square 
in 1991, or just plain defense of China's capital from 
foreign aggressors. 
In contrast to deployment patterns, China's military 
activity did experience a significant change between 1994 and 
1995. The decrease in exercise activity in the Shenyang and 
Beijing MRs indicates a reduction in tensions between China 
and Russia. Meanwhile, increased activity in Nanjing, 
Guangzhou and Chengdu MRs reflect China's changing 
priorities. Beijing's attention appears to be on Taiwan, the 
South China Sea and Southwest China. Implications for Asia 
will be covered in more detail in the next chapter along with 





In order for China to pose a threat to the Asia-Pacific 
region, it must have both the military capability to carry 
out such a threat and the intent to use that capability. 
Analysis of the modernization of the PLA indicates that while 
China's military might is growing, for the most part, it is 
incapable of power projection and force sustainment. In 
addition, China does not seem to have any intention of 
obtaining regional hegemony by force. Chinese leaders have 
persistently claimed that "China will never pursue 
hegemonism." (Ching Pao 1994) My review of their 
modernization activities has demonstrated that Chinese 
leaders are more interested in economic growth than in an 
attempt to obtain regional hegemony by force or threat of 
force. Any move in the latter direction would destabilize 
the region and impede China's economic growth. This does not 
mean, however, that there are no potential flash points in 
the region. The next section will discuss some of the 
implications of China's modernization process for Asia and 
the United states. 
A. :IMPLICATIONS 
1. Russia 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was viewed as 
China's most serious threat. This is evident in the PLA's 
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force deployment patterns during those years with the 
Shenyang and Beijing MRs maintaining the largest 
concentration of troops. The fall of the Soviet Union 
certainly diminished the Russian threat, but did not 
completely alleviate China's fears. China still maintains a 
large concentration of troops on the Sino-Russian and Sino-
Mongolian borders. A report published by the Center for 
Naval Analysis briefly presents two views on the future of 
Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia. "Some see China's 
presence as growing for economic reasons (including energy 
dependency), and as a source of stress in Sino-Russian 
relations that could result in some increase in military 
attention and deployments by Beijing." (Wilhelm 1996) The 
detractors from this position, however, "emphasize the common 
interest both parties have in economic development that could 
foster political stability .... " (Wilhelm 1996) Economic 
competition is not the only potential source of tension 
between China and Russia. A resurgence of Russian communism 
also would prove threatening to China and might strain Sino-
Russian relations. 
China's military modernization program probably will not 
have much impact on Russia. The modernization of China's 
tank force, long range missiles and aircraft may give Russia 
some anxiety, but the biggest threat to the country is 
China's growing population. A peaceful migration and 
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assimilation of Chinese into Siberia and other bordering 
regions could in essence cede Russian territory to China. 
2. Korea 
In the last few years the Chinese appear to be 
distancing themselves from North Korea both economically and 
politically. At one time, China supported the North Koreans 
with "friendship prices" on goods and other forms of economic 
aid. Today, however, China is more interested in stimulating 
its own economy. As a result, it is no longer offering North 
Korea such favorable trading terms or assistance. (Economist 
1994) 
As China slowly moves away from North Korea, it has also 
been moving away from its traditional hard-line stance 
concerning the West and encouraging Pyongyang to follow its 
lead. (Davies 1995) In order to stimulate economic growth, 
China has established a diplomatic relationship with South 
Korea. It is unlikely that China will do anything to 
endanger this relationship, especially since any move against 
South Korea might alienate the United States and Japan. 
Meanwhile, reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a 
real possibility. North Korea has been steadily declining 
over the last few years thus creating the potential for 
reunification. Unification of the peninsula could take place 
in one of several ways. The least desirable path to 
reunification is by military means. A desperate North Korea 
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may attempt to invade South Korea. In this situation China 
would be placed in a very awkward position, in between a 
"sister" communist state and a new trading partner. 
Intervention of behalf of North Korea would alienate not only 
South Korea and the United States but other Asian nations as 
well. Therefore, it would not be in China's best interest to 
intervene in such a conflict. An extenuating circumstance 
that may make such a situation problematic for the Chinese is 
North Korea's control of nuclear weapons. Any Chinese 
decision must take North Korea's nuclear capability into 
consideration. 
Although conflict between China and either of the two 
Korea's is unlikely in the immediate future, China's military 
modernization program does increase China's opportunity to 
achieve victory if a conflict were to arise. Chinese "fist" 
and regular army forces from the Shenyang MR could be moved 
quickly to the Korean border. At the same time, Chinese 
submarines might be deployed to choke points near the Sea of 
Japan and Yellow Sea, making U.S. reinforcement of troops in 
Korea very difficult. Korea's close proximity to the 
mainland makes the peninsula an easy target for Chinese 
missiles. China also would be helped by the short logistics 
pipeline, whereas the United States may have trouble 




Fifty years after the end of World War II, China remains 
wary of Japan's military potential. A resurgence of Japanese 
nationalism along with its remilitarization are China's main 
concerns. While the Japanese military has been for "self 
defense purposes only" since the end of WWII, it maintains a 
very modern force. As a result, I would suggest that the 
Chinese tacitly support the U.S. military presence in the 
region. 
A potential flash point between China and Japan is the 
dispute over the eight islets and reefs known as the Diaoyu 
Islands by the Chinese and the Senkakus by the Japanese. The 
islands, which lie 190 kilometers northeast of Taiwan and may 
contain vast oil reserves, have been in dispute for the last 
25 years. Chinese claim to the islands goes back to the 16th 
century while Japan insists that it annexed the islands in 
1879 when it took over Okinawa and formally incorporated them 
in 1895 after defeating China in a brief naval encounter. The 
issue of sovereignty erupted in 1972 when the United States 
handed the islands to Japan after ending its administration 
of Taiwan. The controversy reignited this past July when a 
Japanese right-wing group raised a temporary lighthouse on 
one islet and placed two memorials and a flag on another. 
(Gilley, et. al. 1996) 
The dispute over the islands has put Beijing in a 
difficult position. "Cumulative Japanese investment amounts 
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to $13 billion in China, $6 billion in Taiwan and $14 billion 
in Hong Kong," so it is not in China's interest to damage 
ties with Tokyo. (Gilley 1996) On the other hand, protesters 
in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan are pressuring Chinese 
officials to stand firm on the issue. 
China has both economic and military reasons not to 
escalate the conflict with Japan. Economically, China 
literally cannot afford to alienate Japan. It relies too 
much on Japanese trade and aid for its own economic 
modernization. Also, while the addition of Jiangwei and Luhu 
class combatants and more capable transport ships to the PLAN 
inventory increase its power in the region, it probably 
cannot compete with Japan's Self Defense Force. Equipped 
with the latest technology, Japan's navy is very formidable. 
4. Taiwan 
In March 1996 tensions between the PRC and Taiwan 
reached a peak after nine months of strain that began with 
Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's unofficial visit to the 
United States in June 1995. Chinese leaders viewed the visit 
as an attempt to raise Taiwan's international status. 
Responding to Lee's visit, China conducted missile exercises 
85 miles north of Taiwan in July and August. Beijing was 
further angered as Taiwan's first direct Presidential 
election scheduled for March 1996 neared. The shift toward a 
more direct democracy was perceived by China as another 
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effort by Taiwan to move toward independence. In an attempt 
to further intimidate Taiwan, China conducted a new series of 
missile tests as well as naval and air exercises in the 
vicinity of Taiwan. The exercises gained the attention of 
the United States which ordered two aircraft carriers into 
the area. 
Prior to this series of events, China appeared to be 
content with the status quo with respect to Taiwan. Beijing 
has always contended that there is only one China and that 
Taiwan is a part of China. The "One China" policy is also 
observed by Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan, however, 
contends that Taipei is the legitimate government of China 
not the government in Beijing. 
In spite of their differences, China and Taiwan have a 
good economic relationship with each other. Trade flourishes 
between the two nations. It is, therefore, not in China's 
interest to blockade or attack Taiwan. Three events, 
however, almost certainly would result in Chinese aggression, 
a declaration of independence by Taiwan or a strong movement 
in that direction, recognition of Taiwan in any organization 
in which membership is based on statehood or the development 
or purchase of nuclear weapons by Taiwan. The risk of 
conflict, in absence of the above, is low, although China may 
continue intimidation tactics if provoked. 
If China felt compelled to take military action against 
Taiwan, it would probably be in the form of a blockade or a 
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few choice missile attacks. Currently, China does not appear 
capable of invading the island, but could most likely conduct 
a successful blockade using naval vessels, mines and 
missiles. The disadvantages to Chinese military action of 
this type are many. First, China potentially could destroy 
the Taiwanese economy and thus hurt its own economy. Second, 
China risks drawing the United States and its superior 
military into the conflict. Finally, China would alienate 
its Asian neighbors. 
5. Hong Kong 
Next summer Hong Kong will transition to Chinese 
sovereignty after 99 years of British rule. The world, 
especially Taiwan, will be watching the transition very 
carefully. China initially agreed to "one country, two 
systems." Differences between China and Hong Kong, however, 
are now surfacing over such issues as political freedom, rule 
of law, and freedom of the press. These differences may lead 
to internal conflict within Hong Kong that will have to be 
quelled by PLA soldiers. Currently, plans call for a 
garrison of PLA troops to be stationed in Hong Kong. There 
is no indication that China will alter this plan, but popular 
uprisings in Hong Kong after the transition may force the 
Chinese to increase its military presence. 
Another possibility for Hong Kong is its use as a naval 
and air base for power projection into the South China Sea. 
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The Chinese currently lack the ability to successfully 
project power into the region and sustain it for more that a 
short time. Hong Kong would greatly increase China's 
military potential in the waters of Southeast Asia. A move 
to permanently station forces capable of power projection in 
Hong Kong would certainly alarm China's already wary southern 
neighbors. 
6. Southeast Asia 
The nations of Southeast Asia are becoming increasingly 
economically interdependent with the PRC. Despite these 
economic ties, many of the nations in the region are 
threatened by China's growing aggression in the South China 
Sea. The South China Sea has long been claimed by the PRC 
and is of strategic interest for two reasons. The South 
China Sea and its island reefs potentially contain abundant 
natural resources. It is also strategically located, 
connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean. (Studeman 
1996) 
For these reasons, China has gradually been increasing 
its military presence in the region. The purchase of Su-27 
aircraft and Kilo class submarines from Russia along with the 
construction of an air/naval base on Woody Island in the 
Paracels served to enhance China's power projection in the 
region. (Richardson 1995) 
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The most volatile point in the region is the potentially 
resource rich Spratly Islands. The Islands are claimed, in 
whole or in part, by six nations including China. An example 
of China's aggressiveness in the region came last February 
when it built a base on Mischief Reef. Mischief Reef, a 
remote atoll 750 miles from China's southern coast, is 
claimed by the Philippines. (Sherwell 1995) China's seizure 
of the atoll displayed a blatant disregard for the claims of 
other nations in the region. Indonesia is also in dispute 
with China over territory in the region. The Indonesian 
owned Natuna Islands, rich in natural gas, are included in 
the South China Sea areas claimed by Beijing. (Suryodipuro 
1995) 
Fear that China's creeping aggression in the South China 
Sea may destabilize the entire region is pervasive. Even 
Vietnam, which claims at least 20 islands, reportedly fears 
China's recent aggression. "Hanoi's effort to establish 
diplomatic relations with the United States are admittedly 
linked to fears of China's growing military punch." (Jameson 
1993) As long as the nations of Southeast Asia and China 
have overlapping territorial claims and Chinese intentions 
are unclear, countries in the region will remain wary of the 
PRC. The wariness, in turn, will result in increased 
military purchases and upgrades in the regions. 
Based on the findings in this thesis, China does not 
have the capability to project forces into the South China 
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Sea and sustain them for more than a very short period. For 
that reason, it is highly unlikely that China will attempt 
any type of military action other than "creeping aggression." 
China appears primarily to be concerned with keeping a 
foothold in the South China Sea. Although it publicly claims 
the entire sea, the PRC has indicated a desire to negotiate 
with other claimants over oil exploration rights. Beijing 
will probably only take military action if it feels that it 
is being edged out of the region. Unilateral attempts to 
explore the South China Sea for natural resources may spur 
the Chinese to act. The countries of Southeast Asia may be 
able to reduce the risk of conflict by negotiating with each 
other and China over the issue. 
7. United States 
Currently, China poses no direct threat to the United 
States. While the PLA has almost three million soldiers, 
sailors and airmen, its current military capabilities are 
estimated to be at least 15-20 years behind those of the 
United States. Efforts to improve the PLA have increased in 
the last 6 years, but modernization continues to occur at a 
moderate pace. Unless this changes, China probably will 
attempt to avoid conflict with the United States in the near 
term. 
The United States, however, could be pulled into a 
conflict in Asia. The two most likely areas of concern are 
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Taiwan and the South China Sea. In the case of Taiwan it is 
in the best interest of the United States to encourage the 
Taipei government to maintain the status quo and avoid 
antagonizing the PRC. Taiwan can operate as an independent 
democracy as long as it does not formally move in that 
direction. 
A conflict in the South China Sea may prompt U.S. 
involvement to protect freedom of navigation in the area. 
The United States, therefore, must encourage communication 
and cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia and 
China. It is imperative, however, that ASEAN not be 
perceived by Beijing as an anti-China organization. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States can take four actions to enhance the 
security of Asia. First, it can promote a policy of 
engagement, not just conditional engagement. I define 
conditional engagement as a policy in which the United States 
ties requirements to foreign relations, whereas a policy of 
engagement is free of such requisites. The only way that the 
United States can have an influence on China is through 
military, economic and political engagement. By linking 
these forms of engagement to conditions such as human and 
intellectual property rights, the United States is 
endangering its relationship with China. Beijing views 
conditional engagement as an attempt by the United States to 
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intervene in China's internal affairs. This perception 
surely brings back memories of China's "hundred years of 
shame." 
A second action that the United States can take to 
better relations with China and promote security in Asia is 
to develop clear policies with regards to the PRC. U.S. 
policymakers have been sending the Chinese mixed signals 
which, no doubt, have Chinese leaders confused. As a result, 
some in Beijing believe that the United States is attempting 
to encircle China and contain it. To remedy this situation, 
the United States needs to develop a clear-cut policy and 
ensure that China understands our position. 
The United States must also maintain a military presence 
in the region. Surveillance flights over the Spratly Islands 
may enable the United States to anticipate a potential 
conflict and prevent it or at least prevent escalation. U.S. 
presence may also deter any potential aggression in Asia. By 
engaging China at every level, developing clear-cut policies 
and maintaining a military presence in the region the United 
States may be able to enhance the security in the region. 
Finally, it is important that the United States 
continuously monitor the PLA's economic activities, 
modernization process, force deployments and exercise 
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